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TATARSTANI PARADIPLOMACY:  PERSISTENCE THROUGH 
COMPETITIVE IDENTITY 
Michael Thomas Renaldi  
Abstract 
The desire to attract foreign investment and tourism, solve transborder issues, or increase 
cultural ties is a crucial part of diplomacy. Solving such issues gradually filtered down to 
non-central governments. The term for the diplomacy of non-central governments is 
deemed paradiplomacy. The most widely discussed cases in paradiplomacy are often 
located in Western, federal democracies. However, local governments that lie outside of 
both categories remain active in international affairs. Thus, this single-case study focuses 
on paradiplomacy in a non-central government outside of Western, federal democracies. 
This thesis examines paradiplomacy in the Russian republic of Tatarstan.  
Specifically, the thesis focuses on the persistence of Tatarstani paradiplomacy after the 
governments shift away from the parades of sovereignties rhetoric and decentralization 
after the mid-2000s. This provides a crucial case to understand how non-central 
governments can utilize paradiplomacy despite their position outside of the traditional 
archetype for paradiplomatic case studies and their means of entrenching their position. 
Thus, this thesis asks: how does paradiplomacy persist after recentralization? The 
research question is explored through a media analysis of Tatarstani paradiplomacy which 
examines two trends: global mega-events and relations with the Turkic world. The media 
analysis is conducted through examining the Russian news outlets Business Online and 
Kommersant to understand the major narratives which show how paradiplomacy persists 
in the case of Tatarstan. Through branding tactics and competitive identity, it is concluded 
that Tatarstani paradiplomacy converges and diverges with Russian federal government 
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policy. In the end, Tatarstani paradiplomacy is divided into three categories: culture as a 
resource, government tool, and promotion and protection of material interests. The 
categories help both the Russian government and Tatarstan, but due to less autonomy 
within Tatarstan, it is concluded that Tatarstan’s paradiplomacy will increasingly 
converge with Russian federal government positions in the future.   
Keywords: Tatarstan, paradiplomacy, Russian Federalism, media analysis, global mega-
events.  
6 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Abstract ........................................................................................................................................ 4 
1. Introduction ............................................................................................................................. 8 
2. Literature Review ................................................................................................................. 10 
2.1 Paradiplomacy: History and Importance ..................................................................... 10 
2.2 What Constitutes Foreign Relations ............................................................................. 13 
2.3 Prior to Recentralization: Spawn of Paradiplomacy in Tatarstan ............................. 18 
2.4 Recentralization Efforts ................................................................................................. 20 
3. Research Design and Method............................................................................................... 23 
3.1 Case Selection .................................................................................................................. 23 
3.2 Method ............................................................................................................................. 24 
3.3 Limitations ....................................................................................................................... 26 
4. Analysis .................................................................................................................................. 27 
4.1 Universiade 2013 – July 1st to July 23rd, 2013 ............................................................... 27 
4.1.1 Transformation: Giving Substance to Strategy .................................................... 27 
4.1.2 Results of Substance: Budgetary Problems ........................................................... 30 
4.1.3 Event Management .................................................................................................. 32 
4.1.4 Tatar Cultural Events .............................................................................................. 35 
4.1.5 Life after Universiade .............................................................................................. 36 
4.2 FIFA World Cup – June 14th to July 15th, 2018............................................................ 40 
4.2.1 Official Diplomacy/Economic Diplomacy .............................................................. 40 
4.2.2 Tatar Cultural Events .............................................................................................. 41 
4.2.3 Audience: Service Sector & Individual Tourists ................................................... 44 
4.2.4 Continued Implementation of Competitive Identity ............................................. 46 
4.2.5 Ensuring the Future ................................................................................................. 47 
4.3 The Annexation of Crimea – February 26th to March 26th, 2014. ............................... 51 
4.3.1 Russian & Tatarstani Stance: Selling Tatarstan ................................................... 54 
7 
 
4.3.2 The Crimean Tatar Response ................................................................................. 57 
4.3.3 Tatarstan’s Competitive Identity & Crimean Autonomy .................................... 58 
4.4 SU-24 Incident – November 25th to December 25th, 2015 ............................................ 62 
4.4.1 A Threat to Competitive Identity: Economic Relations ....................................... 63 
4.4.2 Ending Cultural Events & Link to Larger Regional Struggle ............................. 67 
4.5 Comparison: Three Trends ............................................................................................ 71 
4.5.1 Culture as Resource ................................................................................................. 72 
4.5.2 Government Tool – Tatarstan and Russia ............................................................. 72 
4.5.3 Promotion and Protection of Material Interests ................................................... 73 
5. Conclusion ............................................................................................................................. 75 
6. Bibliography .......................................................................................................................... 78 
7. Digital Resources ................................................................................................................... 82 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
8 
 
1. Introduction 
The shift towards a more globalized world has enhanced the ability for non-central 
governments (NCGs) to play a role in diplomacy and political communication with 
foreign entities. This includes cities, regions, counties, oblasts, okrugs, etc. which possess 
different interests, and often, a better knowledge of how to attract foreign tourists, 
governments, and business investment to their territory. Within this strand of literature, 
known as paradiplomacy, NCGs increasingly act as an analog for their state government 
in the international sphere. Furthermore, the NCGs have long-standing relations with 
states and other international organizations. For this reason, this trend has important 
implications for actors below the state level and the nature of a states’ foreign policy. 
Paradiplomacy, or political communication between an NCG and a foreign counterpart, 
are widespread in federal democracies. Characterized by sound legal grounds, regions 
employ certain functions entitled to them within their constitutions. This characteristic 
has led to an almost universal focus on Western, federal democracies as case studies for 
paradiplomacy. Even though federal democracies provide support for well-developed 
paradiplomacy, the ability for an NCG to engage in political communication is not limited 
to this designated group. The desire to quell transborder disputes, improve economic 
standing, increase cultural ties among similar ethno-, religious, linguistic groups remains 
to NCGs around the world.  
This thesis examines a crucial case of paradiplomacy in Russia after its recentralization 
in the mid-2000s. Looking at the case of Tatarstan provides an opportunity to learn how 
NCGs can continue to engage in foreign relations, even after the central government 
sought to centralize foreign affairs. Thus, Tatarstan provides a crucial case study which 
strengthens the way scholars understand diplomacy in the 21st century and asks the 
research question: how does paradiplomacy persist after recentralization?  
Three primary hypotheses emerge in accordance with the research question: 1) Tatarstani 
paradiplomacy will converge with Russian federal government policy 2) Tatarstani 
paradiplomacy will diverge from Russian federal government policy 3) Tatarstani 
paradiplomacy will show a mix of both divergent and convergent policies with Russian 
federal government policy. This thesis hypothesizes that Tatarstani paradiplomacy evades 
the convergent or divergent dichotomy. Rather, I argue that Tatarstan pursues a mixed 
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assortment of policies in paradiplomacy, which converge and diverge from the Russian 
government’s stance.  
To do this analysis, a media analysis is conducted of two Russian news sources: Business 
Online and Kommersant to understand the major narratives surrounding the involvement 
of Tatarstani paradiplomacy in four events critical to Russian diplomacy. The use of 
media analysis allows for the larger narratives surrounding the persistence of 
paradiplomacy to be understood in greater depth.  
In addition to the media analysis, the events involving Tatarstani paradiplomacy will be 
described through the framework on paradiplomacy created by Panayotis Soldatos, and 
the Tatarstan’s role in paradiplomacy will be further explained through the concept of 
competitive identity discussed by Simon Anholt. Both are critical to describing the 
relationship between Tatarstan and the Russian central government and will be described 
further in the literature review.   
Lastly, the complexity of relations between Russian regions and the federal center means 
that traditional methods of understanding fall short, and this thesis seeks to provide a 
deeper interpretation of how paradiplomacy persists within the complex relationship 
between Russian and Tatarstan. This thesis seeks, in addition, to provide greater 
knowledge of the undefined structure that surrounds the Russian central government with 
each Russian NCG. 
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2. Literature Review 
2.1 Paradiplomacy: History and Importance 
Paradiplomacy was first used by the scholar Rohan Butler (1961) who described the 
process as “the highest level of personal and parallel diplomacy, complementing or 
competing with the regular foreign policy of the minister concerned (p.13).” Butler’s view 
imagined a more secretive or competitive relationship between NCGs and their foreign 
counterparts. Indeed, Butler described a situation that was increasingly noticed by the 
interdependence of the global economy.  
The shift to a more globalized world led to a reformed definition of paradiplomacy in the 
1980s. First, Ivo Duchachek (1984) considered two major trends in paradiplomacy: 1) 
Transborder Regional Regimes 2) Global Microdiplomacy (p. 5). Transborder regional 
regimes include both formal and informal networks which interact because of issues that 
flow across borders such as environmental, economic, and cultural issues. The problems 
resulting from transborder issues encourage subnational governments to cooperate. 
Secondly, the rise of global micro-diplomacy was noted as another offshoot of 
paradiplomacy. NCGs hold formal relations with cross-border and distant states and 
territories to create agreements for economic and political means.  
Paradiplomacy expanded to describe much more than formal relations such as permanent 
representations and high-level meetings between state leaders. Cornago extended the 
meaning of the term in the 1999s: “[Paradiplomacy] can be defined as non-central 
governments' involvement in international relations through the establishment of 
permanent or ad hoc contacts with public or private entities, with the aim to promote 
socioeconomic or cultural issues, as well as any other foreign dimension of their 
constitutional competences (p.40).” Without creating too exhaustive of a list, 
paradiplomacy can be described as the diplomatic efforts of NCGs towards their foreign 
counterparts: 1) Other sub-national governments 2) States 3) Businesses 4) Cultural 
groups 5) Individuals 6) Academic institutions and representatives in the locality 
(Tavares, 2016, p. 228). The foreign relations of NCGs touch these six outlets. Thus, this 
expansion remains important to understanding the dynamic nature of paradiplomacy, as 
NCGs take non-traditional routes to associate with their counterparts abroad. 
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Paradiplomacy possesses different characteristics vis-à-vis the central government: it can 
align, compliment, extend, or conflict with the diplomatic relations of the federal 
government (Duchachek, 1990, p. 32). Following Duchachek, Soldatos introduced an 
important explanatory framework which is integral to this thesis. Soldatos defined four 
different types of paradiplomacy. The first two types can be challenging to distinguish: 
cooperative-coordinated and cooperative joint action models (Soldatos, 1990, p. 38). This 
cooperative-coordinated model indicates that the federal government brings 
paradiplomacy of sub-state entities in line with theirs through formal and informal 
alignment and harmonization that occurs through top-down mechanisms. The second-
type of paradiplomacy, the cooperative-joint model, includes paradiplomacy under the 
federal government’s national foreign policy. In this case, a combined approach through 
joint missions and strategies targets a specific foreign policy issue. The biggest split 
between the two branches of paradiplomacy is between cooperation, which means that 
the origins of the approach came from the federal government, or parallel activity, which 
means that the sub-national entity takes an approach independent from the central 
government and spearheads its efforts (ibid). The parallel action approach divides into in 
harmony and in disharmony (with federal government policy). The in harmony sub-
section indicates that the sub-state entity aligns its policies with the federal government. 
The parallel-in-harmony model can occur with or without monitoring of the federal 
government. Conversely, the in disharmony sub-section deviates from federal 
government foreign policy stances. The final approach, parallel-in-disharmony model, 
attracts the most attention for the potential for further escalation between the federal and 
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regional governments through continued defiance to their policies which sometimes leads 
to secession attempts. The distinctive features of Soldatos’s explanatory framework are 
useful to analyze paradiplomacy.   
Despite the usage of paradiplomacy to describe the actions of sub-state actors, the issue 
of neologisms is rife within the study of sub-state actors. Upon reflecting on the work of 
Panayotis Soldatos’s work, Duchacek noted that while microdiplomacy was his original 
name for the term, paradiplomacy served as a more quality explanation (1984, p. 13). The 
term paradiplomacy utilizes the prefix para taken from parallel to describe a type of 
diplomacy that occurs beside the diplomatic efforts of the federal government. Scholars 
have pursued various other names to categorize relations between sub-state actors and 
federal governments: intermestic diplomacy, catalytic diplomacy, microdiplomacy, 
protodiplomacy, sub-state diplomacy, post-diplomacy, constituent diplomacy, regional 
diplomacy, and multilayered diplomacy (Kuznetsov, 2015, p. 25). Critics assert that each 
sub-national entity is unique in their relations with the central government and cannot 
always be considered parallel. For instance, the Belgian sub-national governments 
possess distinct authority over certain issues and conduct international oversight over 
other regions. However, critics highlight that diplomacy is a part of statecraft, which in 
Belgium, they contend is not the case (Tavares, 2016, p. 8). Thus, the idea of Flanders 
and Wallonia as conducting paradiplomacy remains disputed, and the usage of 
paradiplomacy has received criticism for its tendency to generalize. On the other hand, if 
following Soldatos’s original framework, he leaves out statecraft as a part of sub-national 
governments’ paradiplomatic agenda, though such processes occur in cases like Catalonia 
and Quebec. Parallel does not always mean in conflict with the federal government and 
remains a term that has come to describe the complex relations between various federal 
governments and sub-state government.  
Complex relations arise from the increased difficulties federal governments face in the 
realm of international relations. The central government dispenses competences to local 
governments due to their inability to meet their needs, while simultaneously, entrusting 
them to pursue harmonious relations with central government policy. Sub-state entities 
rely heavily on the central government and each entity lies on a spectrum in its association 
with the national government. The sub-state entity may drift from harmonious to 
conflictual relations with the national government. Kuznetsov (2015) ultimately prefers 
13 
 
the umbrella term paradiplomacy and defines it as a “[a] form of political communication 
for reaching economic, cultural, political, or any other types of benefits, the core of which 
consists in self-sustained actions of regional governments with foreign governmental and 
non-governmental actors (p.31).”  Noting the history of paradiplomacy, I intend to use 
Kuznetsov’s definition within this thesis.  
2.2 What Constitutes Foreign Relations 
This section discusses the different types of foreign relations that occur at the sub-state 
level and the different activities that make up paradiplomacy. First, the section outlines 
the meanings of public diplomacy, competitive identity, branding, and placing branding 
which serve as important concepts throughout the thesis. Second, the different 
paradiplomatic activities are outlined below the federal level. NCGs promote numerous 
initiatives in the international sphere, which lead to institutionalized forms of action by 
the NCG. Examples of the interaction are mainly through the seven listed indicators: 1) 
Regional Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2) Permanent Abroad Offices 3) Official Visits 4) 
Exhibitions and Forums 5) Global and Transborder Multilateral Regional Networks 6) 
Work within official central government delegations (Kuznetsov, 2015, pp. 111-112) 7) 
Global Mega-Events. In this study, I cite global mega-events as an example of 
paradiplomacy as they hold important significance to the location hosting the events, and 
the opportunity to separate the region from its surroundings (Yatsyk & Makarychev, 
2015, p. 144). The four concepts (public diplomacy, competitive identity, branding, and 
placing branding) and paradiplomatic activities will receive further description when 
discussing the theoretical framework for the thesis. 
One of the most notable types of paradiplomatic activities is the regional ministry of 
foreign affairs, which allows for the sub-state government to hold a separate office to 
conduct foreign affairs. Often the ministry is smaller and more specialized than their 
federal counterparts, as the cost of running a foreign ministry is difficult for sub-state 
governments. The issue of cost usually limits regional foreign ministries to locations with 
bigger economies, and thus more funds to spend on maintaining connections abroad. 
Regional ministries may sit in a separate office within the sub-state government or serve 
in a small group as part of the central government. The regional ministry of foreign affairs, 
or the group dedicated to issues in foreign affairs, fulfills the role of policymaking and 
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coordinating the missions abroad to carry out policy goals. (Berridge, Diplomacy: Theory 
and Practice, 2015, p. 10) Another important aspect of sub-state foreign ministries is that 
their powers may be dispersed through various other ministries rather than under the 
umbrella of one specific ministry (Kuznetsov, 2015, p. 112). Thus, each sub-state entity 
may utilize their foreign ministry in a different way, and, in doing so, possess a different 
relationship with the central government.  
The permanent abroad offices represent an external reach for both state and sub-state 
governments. They go by multiple names, usually designed to define them by their 
purpose within the neighboring region, republic, or state. The regional ministries are 
designated in this way as well. The permanent abroad office can almost be considered as 
a sub-state consulate in its function. The office attempt to develop involvement with local 
communities to increase business, cultural, and other ties with the sub-state entity 
(Kuznetsov, 2015, p. 112). For sub-state governments, the permanent representation also 
possesses a symbolic influence of ties that extend across borders and tie groups with 
similar interests together. 
Official visits of sub-state employees to other states, region, sub-state governments as 
well as the arrival of foreign actors to visit sub-state governments also hold importance. 
Kuznetsov (2015) emphasizes that scholars should focus on both qualitative and 
quantitative aspects of the visits: who are they visiting, and how often (p.112)? The skill 
sets of the delegations are also important to distinguish the reasons for the visits. As a 
result, the scholar gets a better idea of the competences of the sub-state entity. 
The involvement of the sub-state government in exhibitions and forums is also an 
important aspect of paradiplomacy. The level of the actors involved also needs accounting 
for. Additionally, the number of meetings that occur and the sectors in which they occur 
are important to understanding the nature of the paradiplomatic efforts of the sub-state 
government.  
The global and transborder multilateral regional networks are another important outlet for 
the NCG. They allow governments often across state borders to associate. This could 
include the joining of the sub-state government into a regional network of state or sub-
state leaders dedicated to various issues. As mentioned earlier, the merging of the local 
government into this group can involve issues related to the environment, economy, 
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cultural issues, etc. The nature of the working groups differs from forums in that the sub-
state entity is combining its knowledge with governments in the global and region to 
produce a result regarding a specific issue. 
The final aspect of paradiplomacy noted by Kuznetsov (2015) is the work of the sub-state 
government in official delegations of the central government (p.112). The work within 
delegations of the central government deviates from the idea of a separate foreign policy 
since the sub-state government is depending on the national government in this aspect. 
However, paradiplomacy also complements national foreign policy. As a result, the work 
of sub-state governments as part of official state delegations is important to understanding 
the relationship they possess and how the sub-state entity positioned itself within the 
foreign policy of the national government.  
Lastly, global mega-events have become an important aspect for states to demonstrate 
their importance in the international sphere. The events filter down to regional 
governments and institutions. This possesses profound opportunities for subnational 
governments to use the opportunity to promote their territorial brand and differentiate 
themselves from the national government (Yatsyk, 2016, p. 174). Global mega-events 
require substantial resources, and after the event, separates the entity from its 
surroundings.  
The use of global mega-events to promote states became popular in the last decade within 
post-soviet Eurasia. Specifically, the use of global mega-events to shape NCG tendencies 
is important in Tatarstan. In recent years, Russia’s involvement in global mega-events 
like the Sochi Olympics in 2014, FIFA World Cup in 2018, and Universiade in 2013 
allowed regions throughout Russia to become more directly involved in global affairs. 
Russia relies heavily on NCGs to carry out events. Within the NCGs and regions, minority 
groups often use the events to promote their cause. Perhaps the greatest reason for this 
occurrence is that many venues for global events are chosen because of their multinational 
nature within the host country, which gives both a risk and opportunity to the host state 
(Casula, 2016, p. 47). Thus, the study uses global mega-events as a key component of 
how paradiplomacy is conducted in Tatarstan.  
Global mega-events are a form of public diplomacy. Gregory (2011, p. 353) defines 
public diplomacy as “an instrument used […] to understand cultures, attitudes, and 
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behavior; build and manage relationships; and influence thoughts and mobilize actions to 
advance their interests and values.” However, traditionalists in diplomatic studies equate 
public diplomacy and branding with white propaganda, where agents, admitting their 
source, engage in political advertising to foreign publics and to a lesser extent their 
domestic constituents (Berridge & Lloyd, 2012, p. 305) (Melissen, 2013, p. 3). Despite 
the traditionalist consideration that public diplomacy distracts scholars from focusing on 
more important diplomatic practices, foreign ministries and diplomatic practitioners use 
public diplomacy to advance their mission (Melissen, 2013, p.3). In this thesis, Tatarstani 
paradiplomacy documents certain aspects considered to be public diplomacy, and more 
specifically branding, on the practice of paradiplomacy.  
Public diplomacy and nation-branding fall under the umbrella of a larger concept known 
as competitive identity (Anholt, 2007, p. 3). Before expounding on competitive identity, 
the topic of branding and tools for branding will be mentioned throughout the thesis and 
used to explain the persistence of Tatarstani paradiplomacy. According to Anholt (2007), 
“[…] branding is the process of designing, planning and communicating the name and 
the identity, in order to build or manage the reputation (p.4).” Branding is one of a few 
parts encompassing the concept of competitive identity which reflects the globalized 
world where many people see a nation, country, or any group through various media 
outlets and form their image almost entirely from information presented to them. Another 
aspect of branding is the concept of place-branding. While it is assumed to be simple like 
a logo or motto, the use of place-branding consists of strategy (reconciling the desires of 
different national actors and pushing them into a single direction that is both inspiring 
and realistic), substance (execution of the strategies expressed which can be e.g. 
innovations, legislation, investment), and symbolic action (actions that are emblematic of 
strategy and remarkable. For example, Kazan becoming the Russian sports capital) 
(Anholt, 2010, p. 13). In the case of governments and nations positioned in a global, 
competing marketplace, they have the task of shaping their image to position themselves, 
while in competition with other actors, for greater benefits in the globalized economic 
system. 
Perhaps, the biggest voice of competitive identity and branding as a government tool is 
Simon Anholt (2007), who asserted, regarding why the issue of competitive identity has 
come to the forefront of diplomacy in the modern era: “[Competitive Identity is not] a 
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strategy for legitimizing state propaganda, just a growing acknowledgment of the 
influence of global public opinion and market forces on international affairs” (p. 19). 
Moreover, “Competitive Identity […] describe[s] the synthesis of brand management 
with public diplomacy and with trade, investment, tourism and export promotion. [It] is 
a new model for enhanced national competitiveness in a global world (Anholt, 2007, p. 
3). As a result, actors wish to control their image through branding for five reasons: 1) 
Image notes a country’s reputation 2) Image determines inflow of tourists 3) Image 
attracts foreign investment and influences external economic relations 4) Image concerns 
even miniscule interactions with a place of interest such as treatment at airports 5) A 
deceiving image can lead to a downfall in how the country is perceived (Rana, 2011, pp. 
75-77). It is important to note that the image is how the audience perceives the entity. In 
response to the high stakes caused by image, brand management has become an important 
tool for actors in the global marketplace. Branding efforts remain a tool even in the realm 
of paradiplomacy. While greater resources remain for states than with sub-state actors, 
regional governments, especially those with a more substantial budget, utilize the 
opportunity to cultivate their image within the state and in the international sphere. In 
terms of institutions of paradiplomacy, it is important to note that image pervades every 
level and institution. Image and competitive identity cannot be cultivated separately but 
often must work within institutions and affect how they operate (Anholt, 2007, p. 73). 
Thus branding, image, and competitive identity remain important aspects affecting how 
institutions work.  
The importance of competitive identity for culture and sporting events is particularly 
important for this thesis. The concept of competitive identity is discussed in conjunction 
with the analysis of mega-events. As Tatarstan and Russia invested heavily in Kazan’s 
development, it is important to note that both the World Cup and Universiade events 
possessed little in long-term reputation for the city or country. The most important mega-
event for the long-term brand is the Olympics (Anholt, 2007, pp. 108-110). This plays an 
important role in the analysis as Tatarstan seeks to build its image around its consistent 
hosting of sporting events. Furthermore, the use of Tatar cultural events is included to 
build the national brand. In this thesis, branding is shown as a tool to harmonize federal 
and NCG motives, while simultaneously moving towards projecting a competitive 
identity through Tatarstan’s usage of global mega-events. 
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2.3 Prior to Recentralization: Spawn of Paradiplomacy in Tatarstan 
The Russian republics remained part of a larger discourse that emphasized devolution of 
centralized state authority due to the fall of the Soviet Union. The parade of sovereignties 
marked the declarations of numerous former Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republics 
(ASSRs) and influential regions within the former Soviet Union. Tatarstan served as an 
example within this narrative for increasing regional autonomy in the Russian Federation 
in the 1990s. Tatarstan officials issued a declaration of sovereignty from the Russian 
government, and subsequently signed a bilateral treaty with the Russian government that 
gave Tatarstan a privileged relationship in comparison to other Russian republics and 
regions. (Slocum, 1999, p. 51). After this process, Tatarstan served as an exemplar for 
relations with the Russian federal government. Despite dependence on central funding, 
even more economically dependent regions like Tyva followed the rhetoric of the era and 
attempted to cede more power from the federal center (Sharafutdinova, 2013, p. 366). As 
noted by Kahn (2000), the parade or cascade of sovereignties marked a larger pattern of 
policymakers ceasing increased power from the federal center (p.60). The nationalist 
movements and willingness of Boris Yeltsin’s administration to cede power led to the 
decentralization that briefly characterized the Russian Federation.  
Paradiplomacy partially rose from the constitutional ambiguity that prevailed during the 
1990s. Tatarstan and Russia signed a treaty “On the Delimitation of Jurisdictional 
Authority of the Mutual Delegation of Powers between the State Bodies of the Russian 
Federation and the State Bodies of Tatarstan” in 1994. The result was viewed as a loss 
for Tatarstani sovereignty since the treaty considered the Tatarstani state to be unified 
with Russia, but nevertheless, never distinctly identified whether the state held 
sovereignty under international law (Slocum, 1999, p. 56). The President of Tatarstan 
from 1991 until 2010, Mintimer Shaimiev, considered the treaty to be between two 
sovereign states. However, after the treaty, many Tatarstani nationalists believed that the 
republic forfeited its sovereignty under international law.  
Throughout the 1990s, and even after the signing of the treaty, Tatarstan continued to 
build its identity as a sovereign actor through paradiplomacy. This development took 
place in a larger Euroislamic identity that clashed with the Russian Eurasianist view in a 
few ways that translated into Russia and Tatarstan’s interactions with the surrounding 
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world. One example of differences was exemplified in the approach of integration of non-
Russian ethnic minorities in the Russian Federation, while Tatarstan wanted region-
specific approaches (Makarychev & Valuev, 2002). The federal center saw Tatarstan as 
having a treaty on the division of powers between Russia and Tatarstan, meanwhile, 
Tatarstan considered itself a state under international law (ibid). First, President Shaimiev 
created an Office of Foreign Economic Policy in 1995, and subsequently expanded the 
office further in 1997 with additional offices dedicated to Tatarstan’s international 
relations (Sharafutdinova, 2005, pp. 392-393). Furthermore, in the 1990s Tatarstan 
opened 16 missions abroad, while only Turkey opened a permanent abroad mission in 
Tatarstan, along with other Russian regions: Chechnya, Dagestan, and the Ivanovo 
Oblast. By the mid-2000s, Tatarstan signed around 50 documents with 15 different states 
(Sharafutdinova, 2005, p. 394). Hence, Tatarstan became an important region in 
association with the federal center. 
The Tatarstani government emphasized the sovereignty and uniqueness of Tatarstan 
through conflicting stances towards foreign actors in contrast to official stances of the 
Russian government. The most notable examples are the signing of friendship agreements 
with Russian regions like Abkhazia (a disputed territory between Georgia and Russia), 
Chechnya, and Ingushetia in the 1990s, which disregarded Russian treaties with foreign 
states (Sharafutdinova, 2005, pp. 395-396). In addition, Tatarstani leaders criticized the 
Russian stance on the NATO bombing of Yugoslavia and considered U.S actions and 
NATO actions during the Kosovo Crisis as justifiable (Sharafutdinova, 2005, pp. 396-
397). The Tatarstani government led a campaign of paradiplomacy that emphasized the 
identity and sovereignty of the republic even when the political results provided little 
function. Thus, paradiplomacy can be described as largely parallel-in-disharmony in the 
1990s and early 2000s. 
The discourse attributed to the parades of sovereignties continued due to a weak federal 
center. Even when subnational entities were incapable of sovereignty, the tendency to 
take power from the federal center persisted. Tatarstan, among other Russian regions, 
used paradiplomacy to construct their identity. However, the discourse was largely 
curtailed as Putin tried to consolidate and recentralize the Russian Federation 
(Sharafutdinova, 2005, p. 404).   
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2.4 Recentralization Efforts  
The election of President Vladimir Putin in 2000 led to a reverse of policies towards 
Russia’s region under Boris Yeltsin’s tenure. Most notably, a shift in rhetoric away from 
the parade of sovereignties eliminated the regional sense that power could be ceded from 
the center. President Shaimiev agreed with Putin’s goals of strengthening federal 
institutions. In addition, strengthening state power along with the Second Chechen War, 
which was widely supported by the population, symbolized the shift away from 
sovereignty and decentralization. Thus, the 1990s ended with a call to recentralize and 
strengthen the Russian federal government. At the time, Tatarstani paradiplomacy 
appeared (Slocum, 1999, p. 51). 
The goal of recentralization could not immediately interrupt the concessions and 
agreements provided by the Yeltsin government. One concession was the celebration of 
Millennium Kazan and the 1000-year history of the Tatarstan’s capital, Kazan. This event 
was important in four different ways: 1) The celebration documented the reliance cities 
and regions had in the post-socialist era on the central government. 2) Tatarstan proved it 
could carry out large-scale events 3) Millennium Kazan showed the potential use of 
Tatarstan’s diverse population 4) Tatarstan was forced to meet certain criteria that 
allowed the central government to harmonize policies federal policies with the Republic. 
Millennium Kazan was the event that began a new era of Tatarstani relations with the 
federal center. 
Although Tatarstan is a wealthier region, officials considered Millennium Kazan vital to 
trigger inflows of central government funding (Kinossian, 2012, p. 346). The payout came 
during Putin’s tenure in the form of 12 billion rubles from the federal budget in addition 
to financing from both regional, city, and private funds (Sharafutdinova, 2013, p. 526). 
As a result, the Tatarstani government received funding for a wide range of projects 
within Millennium Kazan. They included the development of infrastructure, common 
spaces, tourist attractions, business centers, theaters, and stadiums (Kinossian, 2012, pp. 
348-349). The investment was viewed as an image-building strategy that would attract 
foreign and external investment (Kinossian, 2012, p. 344). However, limited connection 
to the city’s infrastructure and the local economy meant various investments remained 
insolvent like the ice rink and the horse-racing track constructed in Kazan, which 
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struggled to attract visitors (Kinossian, 2012, p. 344). Though the initial goal was to grow 
external resources, the pattern after the Millennium Kazan was to seek funding from the 
center for large-scale projects.  
Multiculturalism became a major selling point for holding events in Tatarstan. In this 
way, Tatarstan’s relations between Muslims and Christians served as an illustration of 
Russia’s tolerance among different ethnic, linguistic, and religious groups (Graney, 2007, 
pp. 22-23). Perhaps the most obvious use of multiculturalism was the meeting of the 
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) in Kazan during the 1000-year celebration 
which convened various leaders from around Eurasia (Vorobeva, 2005). In addition, the 
meeting held much importance to the future of the CIS at the time. As Kobrinskaya noted 
(2007, p. 14) many called the 2005 Kazan Summit, the ‘last CIS carnival.’ Moreover, 
President Putin noted the historical nature of Tatarstan as a place that contributed greatly 
to establishing Russia as a “united, close-knit people (Gosudarstvo Tatarstana, 2005).” 
The event contributed to the image of Kazan as a place for multiculturalism and, in 
addition, served a larger purpose for Russia to show its tolerance and coexistence among 
varying groups.  
Both Kazan and Tatarstan shifted their rhetoric to gain funds from the center. The shift 
required Tatarstan to become part of the Russian fiscal framework and harmonization of 
Tatarstan’s tax laws with the federal government (Sharafutdinova, 2013, p. 525) (Corwin, 
2005). Another offshoot of Tatarstan’s alignment with the federal government was 
reconciling the image created in the 1990s as a sovereignty seeker. The new position 
emphasized Tatarstan’s competitive advantage within Russia rather than a sovereign 
actor. For example, Tatarstan sought projects that emphasized global mega-events, 
branding, heritage preservation, and attraction of tourists. As a result, the government 
developed historical sites, Bolgar and Sviyazhsk, with the goal of developing the 
historical consciousness of the people living in Tatarstan and increasing tourism. 
Tatarstan managed to receive funding from emphasis on its competitive identity.  
Despite embracing its competitive identity within Russian, Tatarstan has still seen its 
autonomy decline. While outsiders stopped calling Minnikhanov the President of 
Tatarstan, the designation is still in use within the Republic. But, the designation is 
speculated to end officially in 2020.  In 2017, the special status for the Tatarstan Republic 
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with the Russian Federal government ended. The agreement signed under the tenure of 
former President Shaimiev gave Tatarstan special autonomy to handle its own taxes, laws, 
the provision of Tatarstani passports and citizenship, as well as, participation in 
international affairs. (The Moscow Times, 2017). Finally, the question of language usage 
became an issue with the federal government’s stance that mandatory language 
instruction in minority languages like Tatar should be voluntary.  With Tatarstan’s 
privileges decreasing, the future of paradiplomacy is also at risk. 
Though the setup looks completely controlled by the center, Sharafutdinova and 
Turovsky (2017) note, “Regional governors […] have remained important players in the 
twenty-first century, despite federal centralization efforts, but the way their regional 
agency is exercised has changed” (p.162). The effort for regions and cities to create an 
identity continued after centralization. Important changes occurred in that the regional 
governors were replaced through rotating appointments by the center and candidates in 
sub-state legislatures needed to join a party list that existed in the State Duma. The ability 
for NCGs to separate their policies further from the center made more difficult as a result. 
(Sharafutdinova, 2005, p. 406).  
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3.Research Design and Method 
3.1 Case Selection 
Similar to Quebec and Catalonia, multiple authors cited Tatarstani paradiplomacy as one 
of the most influential and noteworthy cases in the world (Kuznetsov, 2015, p. 44) 
(Tavares, 2016, p. 38) (Cornago, 1999, p. 45). This is partially because of Tatarstan’s 
history during the 1990s and continued relevance in paradiplomacy. In the 1990s and 
early 2000s, paradiplomacy in Tatarstan sought external recognition and adopted 
diplomatic institutions and state symbols to project and build their identity as a sovereign 
state. (Sharafutdinova, 2003). The sharp turn away in the early 2000s offered a new 
narrative towards centralization that led to legal ambiguity and the curtailing of 
sovereignty projection (Sharafutdinova, 2013, p. 361). Although recentralization changed 
Tatarstani – Russian relations, Russian regions view Tatarstan as an exemplar for center-
periphery relations and paradiplomacy in the present period.  
Another reason for the case selection is the breadth of Tatarstani paradiplomacy. 
Paradiplomatic institutions in NCGs around the world are small in character due to limited 
funds, limited scope of the institutions, and the role of the central government as the main 
diplomatic actor within the territory. Tatarstan maintains direct contacts with states and 
Russian regions through the hosting of consulates and embassies within the territory, 
opening consulates in neighboring states and Russian regions, and the signing of 
numerous agreements. In comparison to other regions engaging in paradiplomatic efforts, 
the difference is that Tatarstan maintains educational, cultural, political ties while other 
regions focus primarily on foreign economic development. The Republic of Tatarstan 
maintains international ties with fifteen states and eight subjects of the Russian 
Federation. Within the territory of Tatarstan, seven countries have consulates. Tatarstan 
also holds numerous representatives around the world, six of which are plenipotentiary 
representatives, while five remain permanent representatives, and another twelve are 
trade and economic representatives (Apparat Prezidenta Respubliki Tatarstan, 2017). The 
region presents a robust number of instances to chart the course of paradiplomacy.  
Scholars warn against testing cases in states where paradiplomacy is presumed to flounder 
– undemocratic states and those with illiberal markets (Kuznetsov, 2015, p. 104) 
(Kincaid, 2010, p. 16). The case of Tatarstani paradiplomacy provides an experiment in 
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this realm. This thesis aligns with the idea that Russia’s federalist structure remained in 
places where democratic institutions were at their weakest (Obydenkova & Swenden, 
2013, p. 89). Thus power-sharing in Russia, while differing from a traditional federal 
system, continues in a weaker form in places like Tatarstan. 
The case of Tatarstani paradiplomacy holds relevance to center – periphery relations in 
Russia. When considering regionalism in Russia after recentralization, Makarychev 
(2012) states: “the main impulses that foster institutional change are channeled through 
the activity of those elements of the structure that lack their fixed and properly defined 
place in it and, therefore, are likely to disturb its stability” (p.185). This unfixed structure 
remains within Tatarstan’s external relations. For this reason, in instances when 
Tatarstani paradiplomacy occurs, it serves to disturb the stability within the Russian 
governmental system and provides an opportunity for how paradiplomacy impacts central 
governments. 
3.2 Method 
This research paper utilizes a single-case study on the paradiplomatic practices in 
Tatarstan and asks the following question: how does paradiplomacy persist after 
recentralization? The study uses within-case observations to document the continued 
manifestation of paradiplomacy in Tatarstan though narratives constructed during events. 
For the operationalization of this research, paradiplomacy is looked at through media 
analysis. In this way, the discussions in sub-state and national media recreate discussions 
happening within society and among political elites. Thus, media analysis provides a tool 
to understand how paradiplomacy continues after recentralization: the stances the 
Tatarstani government takes, the foreign actors involved, the Russian government’s 
position, and other discourse arising from Tatarstan’s involvement in foreign affairs.  
Rather than focusing on path tracing of paradiplomacy after recentralization, the research 
will focus on critical junctures that resulted in significant media coverage. All four events 
received significant media attention on both the national and sub-national scale. In 
addition, the events held importance to the Russian central government with large 
amounts of federal investment, and historic low points in relations with Ukraine and 
Turkey. Thus, they provide an opportunity to understand the relationship between the 
federal government and NCG which is important to paradiplomacy. They are analyzed in 
25 
 
two separate sections: global mega-events and Turkic world relations. The specific 
instances selected are the following: 1) The Annexation of Crimea in 2014 2) The Sukhoi-
24 Incident with Turkey in 2015 3) Universiade 2013 4) The FIFA World Cup 2018.  
As the articles surrounding the events are gathered, they will be collected and coded to 
reflect the event different issues discussed within the article. The articles are collected 
through their relevance to the issue at hand: whether Tatarstan is mentioned within the 
article, around what subject Tatarstan is mentioned, positive/negative character of the 
article, who is interviewed, etc. Subsequently, the coded articles will be compiled to form 
the larger narratives surrounding Tatarstani paradiplomacy and how it persists after 
recentralization in Russia.  
The focus is on interviews with academic experts, members of the federal or Tatarstani 
government, local stakeholders commenting on the event, and external actors. The articles 
will be selected within a set period of around one month. For the mega-events, the period 
will cover a few days prior to and after the event. This will allow for the preliminary and 
post-event discussion to be accessed and coded into the overall analysis. Regarding the 
period for the discussion of Tatarstan’s relations with Crimea and Turkey, the period will 
allow for coding the time before, during, and after the resolution. In Crimea, this meant 
the March 16th referendum. In the SU-24 incident, this meant the implementation of 
Russian sanctions. Thus, the period will allow for capturing all aspects of the events in 
question.   
The media sites chosen are Business Online and Kommersant. The choices were based on 
the locations of the sources (Within Russia, in Tatarstan, or outside of Russia). Business 
Online focuses primarily on the events in Tatarstan but has a larger focus on Russian 
national events. Kommersant has a regional affiliate in Kazan but focuses more on the 
Russian Federation and global news. The second reason was for the bias of the sources: 
Business Online offered a centrist view, interviewing people both for and against Russian 
and Tatarstani policies, as well as critical of all actors and events. Kommersant offered a 
semi-critical view of the events regarding Tatarstani involvement in international affairs. 
The analysis of both provides a different media frame or aspects of the event which are 
focused on during the event. The different ways both are framed provide a means with 
which to analyze Tatarstani paradiplomacy from sub-national and national news outlets. 
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Lastly, both provided an adequate method of researching and finding published materials 
on the topics, for the events, publishing them within a specific thread (Conflict with 
Turkey, for example). The choice of Kommersant and Business Online provided both 
practical and informational accessibility that other publications did not. 
3.3 Limitations 
Due to language constraints, the study focuses only on sources produced in Russian. The 
translations from the Russian-language digital sources are my own. The Tatar language, 
of course, holds important significance in Tatarstan as over half of the Republic of 
Tatarstan’s population is ethnically Tatar. However, both Tatar and Russian hold equal 
significance both in the media and government of the Republic. Although the use of Tatar 
would provide an advantage, it does not appear as a disqualifier for completing accurate 
and timely research on paradiplomacy in Tatarstan. Almost all resources are accessible in 
Russian or English.  
Lastly, the media sources remain one part of a much larger body of information available 
to research the topic of this thesis. The selected media sources provide an overlap of 
dominant narratives occurring at the sub-state and federal level which prove useful to 
understanding the major factors contributing to the persistence of paradiplomacy in 
Tatarstan. However, the hypothesis and conclusions of this thesis may benefit from 
further research and analysis on Tatarstani paradiplomacy and on the topic of 
paradiplomacy outside of western, federated democracies. 
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4. Analysis 
4.1 Universiade 2013 – July 1st to July 23rd, 2013 
This section will analyze and detail the main narratives during the 2013 Universiade, 
which occurred from July 6th to July 17th. It must be noted that most of the articles come 
from Business Online, and they are largely positive in their assessment of the 2013 
Universiade. Kommersant, instead, focused more critically looking at the Universiade 
project in association with the large budget provided through federal funding. Since the 
articles span a larger amount of time, the events will be looked at in terms of the major 
topics discussed. 
4.1.1 Transformation: Giving Substance to Strategy  
After years of investment on the Universiade, the discussion of transformation was the 
result of finally putting substance to strategy. Substance is the “effective execution of 
strategy in the form of new economic, legal, political, social, cultural and educational 
activity: the real innovations, structures, legislation, reforms, investments, institutions and 
policies which will bring about the desired progress (Anholt, 2010, p. 13).” In this case, 
investment in Universiade served as a symbolic action as well through identifying 
Tatarstan and Kazan as a region of federal importance. A second symbolic action is 
provided through the label: third capital and sports capital for Kazan. The quoted articles 
are provided from Business Online which focused on the transformation which framed 
the event as transformational. However, the long-term impact and image of Kazan is not 
accepted by the interviewed audience.  
Kazan’s Mayor Ilsur Metshin visited the Old Tatar Village, located in the center of Kazan, 
which was restored in preparation for the 2013 Universiade. The article title is “This is 
not festive tinsel, we are not carrying it away in a box after Universiade.”1 This references 
the results of the various new buildings restored in the Old Tatar Village. Metshin focused 
primarily on the construction of the areas around the village and that it was a necessity 
for the people of Kazan, many of which are Tatar, to receive the new buildings. Metshin 
emphasizes that the changes will remain after the Universiade ends and that the city is 
benefiting from the investment. Within the article, however, a local prefect in Kazan 
                                                          
1 Katargin, D. (2013, July 1). «Ehto ne prazdnichnaya mishura, v korobku posle Universiady ne uberem». 
Retrieved from Business Online: https://www.business-gazeta.ru/article/82918 
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stated his doubt about the local citizens knowing about the reconstruction of the Old Tatar 
Village. He expressed hope that the location would become a place for locals and not only 
a popular tourist spot.2 The statement can be considered a method of calling for more 
investment from the federal government: the idea that the reconstructed area will become 
part of the city’s infrastructure is vital to ensuring more investment. 
The symbolic investment by the federal government in a stadium was also linked to 
Tatarstan’s significance as a Republic and Russian region. President Minnikhanov 
discussed the Kazan Arena and its significance: “history will judge [the stadium] […] for 
centuries as the most powerful object.”3 Thus, the new stadium is linked distinctly to the 
power and influence of Tatarstan. Minnikhanov related the necessity of making the 
stadium a center for residents: “It is a center for young people, people should be brought 
from the region there – after all, sports are there, and entertainment, and joy for children.”4 
The stadium transforms Kazan into a center of entertainment and represents an 
achievement for Tatarstan’s society. The challenges faced during Millennium Kazan 
appeared a focal point of the government: the new sports facilities must connect to the 
infrastructure and increase Tatarstan’s ability to achieve financial independence. The 
failures of Millennium Kazan to connect its infrastructure to a viable strategy represented 
an example of a short-term economic stimulus rather than the development of a brand, 
which is reflected in the strategies pursued during Universiade. 
The comments from Nikolay Valuev, a member of the State Duma, show the benefits of 
the investment: short-term economic gain and long-term positioning. Business Online 
framed Universiade similarly in the article’s title: “Competitions, like Universiade, 
transform cities.”5 Valuev stated, “All the costs are published together. And the general 
cost of holding the competition includes construction, reconstruction of […] roads, and 
heating systems. It all stays in the Republic.”6 Valuev’s analysis meshes with the larger 
narrative that the mega-events are net positives: they transform cities and help the local 
                                                          
2 Katargin, D. (2013, July 1). «Ehto ne prazdnichnaya mishura, v korobku posle Universiady ne uberem». 
Retrieved from Business Online: https://www.business-gazeta.ru/article/82918 
3 Latypov, T. (2013, July 5). Rustam Minnikhanov: «Universiada proydet, i my perebrosim nashi sily na 
ZHKKH». Retrieved from Business Online: https://www.business-gazeta.ru/article/83235 
4 Latypov, T. (2013, July 5). Rustam Minnikhanov: «Universiada proydet, i my perebrosim nashi sily na 
ZHKKH». Retrieved from Business Online: https://www.business-gazeta.ru/article/83235 
5 Abdullin, J., & Bilalov, R. (2013, July 6). Nikolay Valuyev: «Takiye sorevnovaniya, kak Universiada, 
preobrazuyut goroda». Retrieved from Business Online: https://www.business-gazeta.ru/article/83331 
6 Ibid 
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population. Moreover, they maintain the transparency of expenditures and modernize the 
city – making it more attractive to outsiders. The short-term and long-term gain provide 
the ability for Kazan to pursue its strategy of becoming more visible globally while 
helping the local population.  
Towards the end of Universiade, Business Online interviewed Anastasia Davydova, a 
member of the Russian Olympic Committee, who noted that “In Russia, there are now 
three capitals. The business capital in Moscow, Saint Petersburg has been the cultural 
capital since time immemorial, and the sports capital since not long ago became Kazan.”7 
Thus, the status of sports capital is an attempt to elevate Kazan to a city of global prestige. 
During his visit, Vladimir Putin stated that “10-15 years ago Kazan was simply one of 
[many] unimportant, provincial Russian cities. Today it is a plush city with amazing 
infrastructure – both for transport and sports.”8 The use of the symbolic title allowed 
Kazan to separate itself from its surrounding and start to cultivate a new image.  
The audience’s impression of Kazan’s global prestige was the main concern discussed in 
Business Online. As Universiade came to an end, the news outlet interviewed 23 
respondents on a few questions, one of which concerned Kazan’s position as a city. In 
terms of image, there was a consensus that Kazan certainly could be considered a 
European city, but to call it a global city was almost universally denied.9 The Deputy of 
the Government Council of Tatarstan, Nikolay Rybushkin answered: “[…] it is forbidden 
to say that Kazan stands on the same level [as global cities] but it is approaching them.”10 
This answer typifies responses regarding image stating that Kazan remains a city that is 
not global, but a city of merit in Europe. The goal of making Kazan a global city is 
intimately linked with federal investment. Without the federal response to Tatarstan’s 
strategy to host another mega-event, Kazan would be as Putin described, “[an] 
                                                          
7 Zavalishina, T. (2013, July 18). Anastasiya Davydova: «YA dazhe ne predstavlyayu, chto budut delat' 
drugiye goroda, kotorym predstoit provodit' Universiadu». Retrieved from Business Online: 
https://www.business-gazeta.ru/article/84246 
8 Kudrina, O. (2013, July 19). «Nakonets-to eto utro nastupilo!». Retrieved from Kommersant: 
https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/2236633 
9 Maslenkova, E., Andreev, A., Semenova, J., Vagizov, M., & Kolebakina, E. (2013, July 20). Opros nedeli: 
Opravdala li Universiada vashi ozhidaniya i opaseniya? Retrieved from Business Online: 
https://www.business-gazeta.ru/article/84397 
10 Ibid. 
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unimportant, provincial Russian city.”11 For this reason, when considering 
paradiplomacy, it is important to look at Tatarstani – Russian relations, and Tatarstani 
paradiplomacy with a complete agreement between the two actors. The strategy of 
competitive identity in Tatarstan only works with synthesis between Russian investment 
and Tatarstani strategy.  As a result, the paradiplomacy of is considered in Tatarstan is in 
a joint action role where Russia and Tatarstan support each other through in 
paradiplomacy.  
4.1.2 Results of Substance: Budgetary Problems 
The Russian government’s support for Tatarstan’s competitive identity is covered semi-
critically by Kommersant. A large part of the discourse during Universiade 2013 was 
related to budgetary issues. Kommersant posted an interview (“Our economy cannot stand 
one more such event”)12 expressing critical views of holding any more large-scale 
sporting events in Russia. The independent economic expert, Alexander Trifonov cites 
Universiade, the 2015 FINA Aquatic Championships, Sochi Olympics, and the 2018 
FIFA World Cup, of which Tatarstan is hosting or co-hosting, as a drain on the Russian 
economy: “Russia cannot stand one more sport’s celebration, taking into account, that in 
recent time, the expenditures on the Olympics didn’t pay off.”13 The critical nature of the 
article contradicts both the goals of the federal and Tatarstani governments by questioning 
the transformation highlighted throughout Universiade and the economic successes 
thereafter. 
In agreement, Alexey Skopin, interviewee and Head of the Department of Regional 
Economy and Economic Geography at the Higher School of Economics, noted that for 
the long-term image of Kazan to develop there is only one way out for the federal 
government: “write off the debts.”14 As a result, mega-events in the regions are portrayed 
as a product of the federal government since it is required to take authority over most of 
the debt burden.  
                                                          
11 Kudrina, O. (2013, July 19). «Nakonets-to eto utro nastupilo!». Retrieved from Kommersant: 
https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/2236633 
12 Kommersant. (2013, July 4). "Nasha ekonomika yeshche odno takoye masshtabnoye meropriyatiye ne 
vyderzhit". Retrieved from https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/2226164 
13 Ibid. 
14 Shkurenko, O. (2013, July 8). Na universiadnom polozhenii. Retrieved from Kommersant: 
https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/2224013 
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An interview by Kommersant with President Minnikhanov was positive but inquired 
about the future of mega-events in Tatarstan in addition to the drop in the credit rating 
faced by the Republic due to its debt increase. Minnikhanov mentioned both FINA 2015 
and FIFA 2018 as the future events to utilize Kazan’s sports facilities.  In addition, the 
Tatarstani government must think more about how to utilize the sports infrastructure so 
that it continues to add to the Tatarstani economy.15  While Minnikhanov’s views align 
with those expressed, it is important to note the inability to mention how else Kazan will 
attract large-scale mega-events. 
Indeed, the focus within Tatarstan underscores social development and transformation 
over immediate profitability. Kommersant published an interview with the Director of 
ANO, the Autonomous Non-Commercial Organization, Vladimir Leonov.16 ANO is the 
executive directorate of Kazan 2013, and in the future, the executive directorate of Kazan 
2015 and Kazan 2018. For example, to the correspondent that asks if ‘there [is] hope that 
any part of the expenditures will be paid off,”17 Leonov noted, “nobody placed the goal 
in front of us to do a commercial event. Universiade is a social project for the development 
of the city.”18 Thus, the goal is to develop Kazan, and with the next two events alluded to 
FINA 2015 and FIFA 2018, the immediate future presents a chance for applying the 
branding goal of becoming the sports capital of Russia.  However, Kommersant continued 
to scrutinize the perks of the “image dividends” of Universiade versus the monetary gains 
from the investment in the mega-event.19 “In the preparation for Universiade 2013,” it 
was said, “$4.5 million rubles were spent, although the government quotes a 1.5 times 
bigger number by Rustam Minnikhanov from 2009 to 2013 in preparation for Universiade 
2013.”20 Leaving Universiade behind, the battle between image versus good investment 
remained a concern. 
Kommersant published most of the coverage on Universiade’s budget with a critical focus 
on the high cost. The perception from the individuals managing Universiade is that it 
                                                          
15 Sitnina, V. (2013, July 8). "My zhe ne proyeli eti den'gi". Retrieved from Kommersant: 
https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/2224772 
16 Sitnina, V. (2013, July 8). "Nikto iz uchiteley krovlyu ne klal". Retrieved from Kommersant: 
https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/2224770 
17 Ibid.  
18 Ibid. 
19 Kudrina, O. (2013, July 19). «Nakonets-to eto utro nastupilo!». Retrieved from Kommersant: 
https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/2236633 
20 Ibid. 
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develops Kazan but that it simultaneously created large debt that Tatarstan could not 
repay. In this way, the global mega-events show a coordinated joint effort of 
paradiplomacy. The Russian federal government dispersed the funds, and Tatarstan 
managed the event.  
4.1.3 Event Management  
Event management was one of the most visible narratives presented during the 
Universiade. Both Business Online and Kommersant discussed this aspect positively. The 
ability for Tatarstan to host an event of such magnitude is represented on multiple fronts: 
openness to investors, avoidance of corruption scandals, effective management of 
building structures, ensuring safety and consensus among residents, creating a 
professional environment for the regulation of sports facilities and athletes. All provide 
an environment beneficial to the central government. Consequently, a crucial aspect of 
the persistence of paradiplomacy in Tatarstan is due to Russia’s ability to entrust Tatarstan 
with significant financial resources.  
As discussed in Kommersant, the ability for Kazan to manage relies on their ability to 
provide volunteers, manage doping tests, provide security, achieve better social 
consensus than places like Sochi.21 Lastly, one interviewee believes that a reason for the 
improved event management within Tatarstan is the national character of the Republic.22 
The article quotes the Advisor to the Director General of the Kazan 2013 Executive 
Directorate for Sports, Olga Pavlova, who says that the event is at a higher level because 
of the well-trained in comparison to the previous Universiade in China.23  
The articles’ author, Olga Shkurenko claimed that Tatarstan’s government achieved 
community consensus during Universiade through providing clean streets and removing 
traffic jams.24 In support, Pavlova acknowledges that the only groups who protested the 
event were homosexuals who were not allowed to hold a parade during Universiade, and 
animal rights activists “demanding to cancel the Universiade in ‘the city, where they are 
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killing feral dogs.’”25 Ilsur Metshin noted that “Not everything was smooth” in trying to 
convince the local population to accept Universiade but still achieved less negative 
feedback than Sochi, for instance.26 Thus, the Tatarstani government is portrayed as 
achieving consensus at a higher level than other regional governments. In the end, 
Universiade is, partially, lauded by Kommersant, in comparison to Vladivostok and 
Sochi.27 For this reason, Tatarstan outcompetes many other NCGs interested in hosting 
large-scale events.  
For maintaining order during the Universiade was employed a large police force with 
staff from all over Tatarstan and Russian. Shkurenko stated that it “defeat[ed] 
imagination.”28 In total, 30,000 police and an additional 1500 armed-forces members 
were present in the city.29 The cost to the Tatarstani budget was 10 million rubles but it 
was considered a necessity to avoid security risks. It was considered a necessity for 
Tatarstan to provide the feeling of a global mega-event that the event required by 
increasing the amount of security on the ground. 
Tatarstani leadership is mentioned for its ability to avoid corruption scandals, which is 
another key component of event management. Skopin considers this skillset to be 
attributed to the regional government leaders’ role as “fathers of the nation.”30 This 
position is portrayed as positive because they are not fighting only for themselves. As for 
the brand that Tatarstan promotes to the outside, the image from the federal government 
also differs. The main attribute being that multinationalism is not the reason for the 
Republic’s success in securing federal funding but only nationalism. In this way, the 
mega-events require an internal and external brand. An important aspect targeted in the 
Metshin interview is the subject of event management.31 The interviewer noted that, in 
contrast to Vladivostok and Sochi, “you [i.e. Metshin] had no corruption scandals. How 
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did it turn out this way?”32 Metshin avoided answering the exact question, instead he 
described the transformation, focusing on the fact that it was important to utilize the 
federal funds, and that corruption is the result of a “few fallen tiles;” the question delves 
in the tenuous nature of federal subsidies and the reason why Tatarstan continues to attract 
federal inflows.33 
Both media outlets portray Tatarstan's ability to finish projects in a systemized and 
orderly manner. Prior to the opening of Universiade, the Tatarstani government alongside 
investors announced the opening of the Korston Hotel. Kuznetsov, Head of the Korston 
Group, noted the business-friendly nature of Tatarstan: “I went around three/fourths of 
the country, socialized with governors […] nowhere are there such relations with an 
investor.”34 The positive article sheds light on the atmosphere Tatarstan promotes to 
outsiders: modernity, transparency, and efficiency. A second example involves the 
coverage of the opening ceremony of Universiade. Kommersant noted that “the Olympic 
village was also prepared with the systemic character of Tatarstan.”35 Thus, the attraction 
of Tatarstan remains its ability to attract investors and build projects on time.  
Kommersant labelled Universiade as a “test” for the upcoming Sochi Olympics and a 
means for surpassing past mega-event.36 Mayor Metshin repeated the comparison in a 
Business Online article: “if you don’t take into account the level of the participants, Kazan 
2013 surpassed London 2012 on all key metrics.”37 The narrative focused on the 
preparation for the Sochi Olympics. Safety remained a big concern during Universiade. 
Business Online published an article related to the use of drones, fighter jets, and military 
helicopters during Universiade. The response was slightly negative and skeptical of the 
usage of military aircraft to monitor the event. The article was titled, “Big Brother will 
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observe Kazan with Drones.”38 To answer the question “Is it necessary to have such 
military aircraft in Kazan?”39 the journalist interviewed a military expert, who answered 
that, in his opinion, “this is too much firepower.”40 While the article remains skeptical of 
reasons why the military would send warplanes, it concluded that Universiade served as 
a precursor to demonstrate the various government departments’ ability to cooperate 
during the Sochi Olympics but on a smaller scale. 
In the end, both media outlets portrayed Universiade as an event that requires agreement 
both from the federal government and the NCG. On the side of the federal government, 
local event managers are needed to effectively oversee mega-events. This means avoiding 
corruption scandals, providing plans for mega-events to show potential solvency, an 
adequate amount of security, and achieving consensus among important local groups. If 
this idea is followed, Tatarstan found a niche in federal funding opportunities in Russia. 
But, the cultivation of an image is also necessary to receive federal funding for events. In 
providing funding, the Russian federal government achieves local compliance. The 
objective of sports capital cannot be achieved without responsible event management. 
4.1.4 Tatar Cultural Events  
One way for NCGs to engage in paradiplomacy is through their cultural events. In the 
realm of competitive identity, cultural events can cultivate a global audience (Anholt, 
2007, pp. 109-110). Perhaps the only display of Tatar culture that escaped mere 
mentioning was during the celebration of Sabantuy, a holiday for various Volga 
nationalities like the Chuvash, Bashkir, and Tatars. To increase awareness of this event, 
the government moved Sabantuy to accommodate the presence of foreign tourists in 
Kazan. Business Online noted: “parallel from the export version of Sabantuy, behind 
fences and surrounded by thick cordons the city of Kazan’s Sabantuy gathered around 
ten-thousand city residents.”41 The author emphasized the delineation between the two 
groups and the public diplomacy occurring within one sphere. The export version of 
Sabantuy gathered the main political elites of Tatarstan. This included former President 
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Shaimiev, President Minnikhanov, Kazan Mayor Ilsur Metshin, the former Minister of 
Sport, Vitaly Mutko, who was also present along with former FISU Present Claude-Louis 
Gallien. The Sabantuy celebration represented the largest, and seemingly, only distinctly 
Tatar cultural event that accommodated foreigners during the Universiade.   
Business Online framed Sabantuy in a positive light and noted that the FISU President, 
Jean-Claude Gallien, declared that it was “the best Universiade in the history of FISU.”42 
This became the headline for Business Online’s article about the event, and a repeatedly 
quoted statement moving forward as experts, government officials, and Russian citizens 
reflected on the 2013 Universiade. 
Sabantuy was accepted by Russian officials and praised by the leaders of FISU in the 
coverage. In this way, the use of competitive identity is notable through utilizing public 
diplomacy and documenting the unique nature of Tatar culture. It is important to note that 
positivity is compulsory during the events, and with the necessity to responsibly manage 
Universiade to ensure future funding, Sabantuy represents the premier means of 
promoting Tatar culture.   
4.1.5 Life after Universiade 
The most important aspects regarding life after Kazan are related to the cultivated image 
from hosting the first mega-sporting event in the republic and the long-term feasibility of 
becoming embodying the brand: sports capital. The analysis of life after Kazan continued 
throughout the event. Business Online asked in an interview with the Kazan City 
Manager, Alexey Pesoshin, “is there life after Universiade?”43 The article discussed that 
Kazan’s infrastructure will receive more investment after the Universiade ends and more 
than the prior year.44 In addition, the solution to life after Universiade can be found in 
asking Kazan’s population what other mega-events should or can be held in the city.45 
Metshin believes that the investment in Universiade has transferred Tatarstan from the 
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periphery to a global hub for investment and entertainment. Thus, he answers positively 
that Tatarstan has hope, but still, that Tatarstan must find the answer to this question. 
Perhaps, the most important expression of what Universiade gave to Tatarstan was 
provided by Marat Khairullin, the Deputy of the Government Council of the Republic of 
Tatarstan and the Economic Committee for Investment and Entrepreneurship.46 He 
considered that experience was the greatest thing gained: in building and cooperating with 
the different federal departments and international organizations, with foreign tourists, 
with mass media outlets, etc. Khairullin mentions the difference in development since 
Millennium Kazan: “[then] a narrow circle of guests arrived at us: heads of the CIS 
countries and heads of the Russian regions. And, now, it is thousands of people from 
dozens of countries.”47 His concluding thoughts were that Tatarstan has become an 
authority in this sphere and that it must make a bet on the development of Tatarstan in 
this area.   
The role of the audience is vital to the successful implementation of Tatarstan’s 
competitive identity. Business Online released a poll on July 20th with interviews of 
leaders in Tatarstan in business, politics, and non-profit with the themes surrounding: “is 
Kazan a global city? Should or can Tatarstan or Kazan host the 2024 Olympics? How 
was security? Did you watch or attend the events? If you own a business, did it benefit?”48 
As it became apparent in their answers, the questions show the importance of image, 
Kazan’s future, event management, and personal interest in association with global mega-
events. Moreover, the questions show that much of the importance of this paradiplomatic 
event is about ensuring the image of Tatarstan and Kazan. In achieving a quality 
reception, the NCG can then achieve a greater presence internationally.  
Another discussion related to life after Universiade was the measure of optimism within 
Tatarstan about the future. Business Online examined results from a survey conducted by 
the Republic of Tatarstan and the Kazan Federal University around the “Evaluation of 
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Public Opinion about Problems with Public Safety and Activities of Law Enforcement in 
the Republic of Tatarstan.”49 The general conclusion of the research is that the residents 
of Tatarstan are more optimistic about the future and that the public services and law 
enforcement have improved. Business Online relates this to Universiade and the flow of 
investment and alleviation of certain problems in Kazan: traffic, the building of sports 
facilities, and other social projects. Thus, the event achieved a short-term strategy of 
boosting the immediate benefits to the region. 
The views of interviewees, representatives of businesses and research centers, are less 
optimistic. For example, business owner, Vladimir Pavlenko noted, “Tatarstan, besides 
oil, produces nothing special.”50 All agree that there is a form of optimism; however, this 
optimism and satisfaction comes from the long-standing positive elements of Tatarstan’s 
economy.  Director of Social Research and Citizens’ Initiatives, Lilia Sagitova 
underscored Pavlenko’s statement: “people go to work, the students study, there is an 
absence of conflict.”51 Moreover, Sagitova stated, “Tatarstan is well-developed in the oil, 
energy, and aviation sectors, but that the situation in the republic should not be 
idealized.”52 Satisfaction with the federal government’s investment in the Tatarstani 
economy is presented. Pavlenko states that “the investment of money has a result [the 
building of new facilities, improving roads, and trickle down from the builders who then 
spend the money within Tatarstan]. Because of this, there is optimism.”53 The 
Universiade is not explicitly mentioned as a generator of income for Kazan but the 
investment of federal funding is. Rather, the increased focus from the federal government 
to Tatarstan outweighed any value provided from the strategy, substantiation, and 
symbolic titles placed in Kazan from the federal government. Thus, Kazan as an attractive 
place has increased but not enough to generate the large-scale trust of its imminent 
success. 
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Global visibility through global and cultural events require large-scale cultural events, 
which remain in the audience’s mind for a long time. The only sports event left is the 
Summer Olympics. As noted by Anholt (2007): “The Summer Olympics is in a category 
of its own.” This became an important narrative within Business Online. Regarding 
Kazan’s application for the 2024 Summer Olympics, all respondents answered positively 
that they would support an application. The only skeptical response was given by a 
Deputy of the Government Council of Tatarstan, Marat Khairullin, who said that “Maybe 
it would be worth it to conduct some global exhibition, dedicated, for example, to progress 
in research and innovation.”54 Aside from Khairullin, the general view was that Kazan 
should apply for the Olympics after carrying out the World Aquatic Championships in 
2015 and the FIFA World Cup in 2018. Davydova discussed the Olympics and FINA 
Aquatic Championships after the Universiade and stated that “Kazan is already prepared 
for the FINA Aquatic Championships.”55 FINA remained a key component of the 
continuation of Tatarstan’s brand as hosting mega-events and Kazan’s reputation as the 
sports capital of Russia. However, without the Summer Olympics Kazan must continue 
the pattern pursued with FINA and Universiade: convincing relatively peripheral sports 
events and international sports organizations to allow them to host their events.  
Even though the future of mega-events is deemed certain with FINA 2015 and the FIFA 
World Cup 2018, Tatarstan has competition for holding mega-events thereafter. For 
example, the Russian Olympic Committee mentioned Saint Petersburg as the potential 
host of the 2024 Summer Olympics, which illustrates the problem of internal competition 
amongst Russian cities for global sporting events.56 While Tatarstan is branded as the 
sports capital of the Russian Federation, it must still compete with other locations.  
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4.2 FIFA World Cup – June 14th to July 15th, 2018 
4.2.1 Official Diplomacy/Economic Diplomacy 
Competitive Identity, as the combination of branding, export promotion, trade, 
investment, and public diplomacy, benefits in many ways from global mega-events. One 
of which is the chance for Tatarstan to conduct highly visible meetings with close heads 
of state. Within the published articles on the World Cup in Kazan, a few highlighted the 
arrival of foreign diplomats and former members of the government. The most important 
person to visit during the World Cup was Kazakhstani President, Nursultan Nazarbayev. 
It was his fourth visit to Tatarstan and his first since the Millennium Kazan. The 
discussion between President Minnikhanov and Nazarbayev mainly revolved around 
cultural affinities and the desire to increase economic ties between Kazakhstan and 
Tatarstan. Nazarbayev stated that “I came to the conclusion that our 700 million [dollars] 
in trade must increase to 1 billion.”57 As seen through highly visible meetings with heads 
of state, the hosting of mega-events allows Tatarstan to increase economic ties and to 
emphasize the cultural importance of its foreign ties. During the event, President 
Minnikhanov gave Nazarbayev an honorary doctorate from Kazan Federal University.58  
As the World Cup continued in Kazan, the representative of the Kazan Kremlin, Lilia 
Galimova, discussed the topic of diplomacy and economic diplomacy as a benefit of 
hosting the World Cup. Galimova stated that they are examining the World Cup “not 
simply as an opportunity to show Kazan to tourists around the world, but as a platform 
for building business contacts.”59 Though the results are hard to assess through the media 
analysis alone, the Tatarstani government met with Spanish ambassador and the Minister 
of Culture, as well as, a businessman, Mehdi Sanai, who is the leader of an Iranian bank. 
However, it appeared that Tatarstan suffered in some ways the effects of the political 
boycott that took place as ex-French President Nicholas Sarkozy, ex-German Chancellor 
Gerhard Schroder, and Princess Hisako Takamodo of Japan visited Tatarstan. There were 
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no comments from the Tatarstani government on this issue and it was not directly 
mentioned in the publications surrounding the World Cup.  
The strain from sanctions and economic stagnation on Russia damaged Tatarstan’s image 
to foreign investors. In an interview with Shamil Ageev, the representative of the 
Chamber of Commerce and Industry of the Republic of Tatarstan stated, “We [the 
Tatarstani government] understand that the problems have reached new heights, and we, 
at least, must show real life without embellishment. We have a high tax burden, low 
wages, and it’s impossible to receive credit.”60 As it relates to the success of 
paradiplomacy, it was difficult to develop economic ties during the World Cup.  
4.2.2 Tatar Cultural Events 
The use of Tatar cultural events to appeal to outsiders took a more pronounced role during 
the FIFA World Cup. In comparison to Universiade, the discourse focused on more 
cultural events and how to develop a strategy that takes visitors to locations that resemble 
Tatar culture in a better light. Business Online profiled the Koresh World Championships. 
Koresh is a type of wrestling practiced across Central Asia with a specific Tatar-style. 
The article focused positively on the carrying out of the Koresh World Championships, 
and specifically, relating it to the World Cup. In this sense, Koresh was a way for Tatar 
culture to interact with the world and save the Tatar language and cultural traditions. As 
one interviewee noted, “As we are now applying effort to saving the Tatar language, such 
attention should also be devoted to fighting.”61 The article attempts to compare Koresh 
with football by comparing the number of countries involved in the championships of 
both sports but acknowledges the vast differences between the two. Both Koresh and 
Sabantuy represent attempts to develop a space for Tatar culture during global mega-
events. The discourse during the World Cup attempts to associate them with public 
diplomacy; however, both acknowledge the limitations of introducing Tatar culture to the 
outside world and the issues with language policy. 
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The government of Tatarstan planned Sabantuy during the FIFA World Cup in 2018. The 
article discussed the positives and negatives of hosting a cultural event during mega-
events like the Confederations Cup, FINA Aquatics Championship, Universiade 2013, 
and FIFA 2018.62 One of the negatives is that the event was split into two groups: those 
who received official invites and the rest. The article highlights the dissatisfaction of 
residents at having to wait in lines and the division of the cultural celebration. Conversely, 
the article posts the satisfaction of visitors from various countries participating in 
Sabantuy, “Poles, Iranians, Portuguese, and a large delegation from Uruguay liked taking 
pictures with our women and dressing up in Russian and Tatar traditional costumes.”63 
Thus, Business Online noted that Sabantuy has become an important aspect of mega-
events in Tatarstan but does have negative effects on the local populous. The ability to 
host large-scale Tatar cultural events is relatively limited, and with the growth of 
attendees, the concern is highlighted by local citizens about the size of the event impacting 
its quality. However, Sabantuy represented a distinctly Tatar option to expanding the 
mega-events hosted without external competition as exist in the realm of global mega-
events.  
A former member of the World Tatar Congress, Rinat Nasyrov, was interviewed by 
Business Online about his departure from the organization and on issues with the Tatar 
culture and language, and on issues with entrepreneurship in Russia. He noted that “There 
isn’t a problem with the Tatar language, [however], the deputies of the Tatarstani 
Government Council and deputies of the Government Duma from Tatarstan, almost one-
hundred percent, voted against the [Tatar] language. I was completely disappointed.”64 
While Nasyrov believed that the Tatar language and culture remain alive, he considered 
that the Tatar people are not united and that the Tatarstani government possesses no role 
in helping them. Nasyrov continues, “Tatarstan is located inside of Russia and cannot 
change the politics, but it tries to unite people through positivity: Universiade passed, the 
World Cup is taking place, and the 100-year celebration of Tatarstan is being prepared. 
The Republic is changing through the positive. But the government is declaring that the 
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people should not work.”65 Nasyrov’s response contributes to a wider discourse occurring 
about how Tatarstan treats issue within the republic: positivity is associated with the use 
of mega-events. However, Nasyrov believes they ignore many issues occurring among 
Tatars and in Tatarstan. The necessity of positivity in Tatarstan’s competitive identity is 
noteworthy, as the changes require consensus from the Russian federal government. 
Though the desire from a competitive identity might lead to an independent actor, 
Tatarstan remains dependent on the central government for implementing a branding 
strategy. 
As the World Cup continued, issues relating to Tatar culture, language policy, and other 
problems grew increasingly related. In a Business Online article titled: “Vladimir 
Vladimirovich would arrive from Bogatye Saby inspired to say, ‘I would live there.’”66 
The Tatarstani Government Council discussed an ultimatum for the republic. They should 
create a Tatar Las Vegas, Tatarize their religion, and increase tourism to Bogatye Saby, 
a small town consisting of only Tatar language speakers.67 While, Fatih Sibagatullin, a 
deputy in the Tatarstani Government Council, insisted to discuss the matter after the 
World Cup, the desire was to increase tourism to other places besides Sviyazhsk and 
Bulgar. Sibagatullin emphasized that tourism needs to promote Tatar culture and that the 
most popular tourist places caused great pain for Tatars, “[The island of Sviyazhsk] 
brought a lot of grief to the Tatar people – the war encampment of Ivan Grozny, his 
outpost for capturing Kazan, generally a deathly place. Then, there was a prison there 
where the intelligentsia was shot.”68 Despite the view that indicates the tenuous history 
between Russians and Tatars, Sibagatullin insists that the Tatars inflicted the current 
damage upon themselves: “it is necessary for us to work with parents, not curse Volodin 
and Vladimir Putin and Dmitri Medvedev – it is necessary to work ourselves […] we 
need to propagandize Tatar.”69 While the World Cup is not mentioned as a source of the 
problems within Tatarstan, the desire to link global mega-events to parts of the republic 
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in its current form are a desire. The stance of Sibagatullin represents the major problem 
of an NCG with limited recognizability and attractiveness outside of Russia. 
The coverage of Tatar culture came universally from Business Online. As for 
paradiplomacy, it highlights the joint structure of public diplomacy between Tatarstan 
and Russia. The way the image of Tatarstan is presented during the mega-events was of 
increasing importance, which called into question the benefits for the Tatar ethnic group 
as a part of the events. However, the Tatarstani officials remained unwilling to blame the 
central government for any issues.  
4.2.3 Audience: Service Sector & Individual Tourists 
After the World Cup in Kazan finished, the Government Committee on Tourism in the 
Republic of Tatarstan commented on the positive figures seen during the event. Tourists 
spent 11.2 billion rubles and 300,000 visited, and the committee projected about 18 billion 
rubles spent as the projections were mainly on the visitors who purchased tickets to the 
World Cup games.70  
However, Business Online noted the overall stimulus for the local economy critically. As 
the FIFA World Cup approached the final week in Kazan, Business Online interviewed 
13 business owners, who mostly considered that the World Cup was successful.71 Zufar 
Gayazov mentioned, “In our shops located in the city center, the situation improved, 
because [football] fans mainly walk on Bauman.”72 If the location was not on Bauman 
Street, the main tourist area in central Kazan, the World Cup provided little increase in 
business. Regarding a traditional tourist location, Sviyazhsk, Artem Silkin, the general 
director of the “Island City Sviyazhsk,” stated that due to mega-events “there is a limit 
on the movement of transportation and an increase in prices on hotels, airplane and train 
tickets. This leads to a fall in domestic tourism…”73 While certain sectors succeed, they 
succeed within small boundaries, and this is displayed in a negative light.  
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In a negative article, Timur Dugin, a hostel owner in Kazan, was published saying “the 
World Cup is a show the government puts on for itself.” The hostel owner claimed that 
the police, the health board, as well as a recent law passed in 2017, limited his profits. 
According to Dugin, a law regulating accommodation prices during the World Cup and 
Confederation Cup set the minimum price for any hostel at “3400 rubles per room.”74 
This limits the profits for hostel and hotel owners during both sporting events. One of the 
most immediate payoffs in hosting a sporting event is to the local economy and the service 
sector. However, with mixed results, the ability for Tatarstan to rely on consensus is a 
challenge to the republic’s ability to attract more inflow of federal funds. 
More emphasis was placed on noting the presence of tourists in Tatarstan and the account 
of their stay in Kazan. For example, Business Online profiled the tweets of an Englishman 
who said he wanted to work for Tatarstan’s tourism agency. Indeed, his views on the 
event were positive: “is there any chance I can stay in Kazan after the #WorldCup and 
get a job in the city’s tourism department? Please.”75 The contribution of tourists to the 
overall discourse occurring around the World Cup was much larger in comparison with 
Universiade. 
Groups of Tatars who never visited Kazan came to support Germany during the event. 
Business Online published a detailed article about this on July 15th. Perhaps, the most 
notable parts of the interview with the Tatars were their negative responses to the absence 
of Tatar culture in everyday life. “We wanted to hear the Tatar language, but on the streets 
of Kazan, the Tatar language cannot be heard, young people are not conversing – there’s 
no emotion when walking on the street…it gives a sense of passivity and depression.”76 
Furthermore the interviewee states, “as foreigners, we did not see the Tatar language here, 
this is offensive.”77 Perhaps a positive note given from the article was about the Tatar 
cuisine: “in Kazan, we eat echpochmaks!”78 In addition, the issue with language and lack 
of visible Tatar traditional outfits received negative feedback from the visiting Tatars. 
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The strategy appeared to have developed a strong image for certain tourists for sports; 
however, for those looking to engage in Tatar culture, the audience rejected certain 
aspects of Tatarstan as the center of Tatar culture.  
4.2.4 Continued Implementation of Competitive Identity 
There was a FIFA press briefing which invited the spiritual leader of Muslims in the 
Republic of Tatarstan, Kamil Samigullin. As expressed during Universiade, Samigullin 
noted regarding the multifaith nature of Kazan, “this is daily work that depends on all of 
us. We need to come to an understanding that Russia is our common home, and at the 
same time, each [religion] has its own apartment. We can live in one place: Christians, 
Muslims, Atheists...”79 The coverage of Business Online taps into a narrative utilized 
during mega-events in Tatarstan and the form of public diplomacy engaging outsiders. It 
allows for Tatarstan and Russia to highlight their ability to peacefully coexist and to bring 
together tourists from different religious and ethnic backgrounds. 
The brands are covered skeptically by Kommersant, which profiled each city hosting the 
World Cup. The profile of Kazan is represented in what separates the city and the region 
from the other 13 cities hosting football matches: Sabantuy and Bugulma, a Tatar version 
of the alcoholic drink, Jägermeister.80 Sabantuy, a Tatar summer festival originally 
celebrated among rural farmers, was again moved to accommodate the arrival of both 
internal and external migrants. The brands established during Universiade endured in the 
five years between Universiade and the FIFA World Cup. As Kommersant noted, “Kazan 
loves to call itself ‘The Third Capital of Russia (This brand is registered),’ and ‘The 
Sports Capital of Russia.’” The idea of Kazan’s brand has remained a stable part of 
introducing Kazan to Russians and outsiders during mega-events. Though, Kommersant 
meets the brand with skepticism, which shows the relative lack of trust surrounding the 
title. In addition, the article shows the long-term place-holders of Tatarstan’s touristic 
brand: The Kul-Sharif Mosque, Bulgar, and Sviyazhsk are mentioned due to their addition 
as UNESCO Heritage Sites. The additions to this were the mentioning of Chistopol and 
Yelabuga, cities which were home to great writers during the Soviet era. As first noted 
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during Universiade, the Old Tatar Village also became an important part of Kazan for 
foreign tourists mentioned.  
Business Online took the opposite stance regarding Kazan’s brand. In understanding what 
was learned from the World Cup, Business Online noted that “it was interesting to observe 
how well the stereotypes [brands] about the city work that Kazan residents themselves 
perceive with irony. Fans in personal conversations and foreign press remember [Kazan 
as] the ‘sports capital of Russia,’ and the ‘third capital.’81 On a more critical note on Tatar-
Russian relations, “one group of tourists [said] ‘Kazan is a Northern/Russian Istanbul.’"82 
Business Online then noted, “possibly a new meme will be used for the attraction of 
tourists, although Moscow will not like such comparisons.”83 Indeed, this comparison 
was made again by a Japanese sportscaster during the World Cup: “I feel the atmosphere 
of Turkey here. [Tatarstan] has the feeling of the East, but it is forbidden to say that it is 
quite Europe.’84 Although the association in cultural relations does not make the 
connection between Istanbul and Kazan, surprisingly neither references were mentioned 
in the official branding of Kazan and Tatarstan. Moreover, the messaging that “Moscow 
will not like [the] comparison” underscores the idea the requirements of Tatarstan’s 
competitive identity.85 In sum, the hosting of multiple mega-events led to a somewhat 
trusted image of Kazan from tourists and Russians themselves. However, the continued 
development of Tatarstan’s image requires more investment and the hosting of more 
mega-events. 
4.2.5 Ensuring the Future 
The end of the FIFA World Cup in Kazan triggered, like after Universiade, the question: 
Is there life after the World Cup? In this instance, the answers came with increased 
uncertainty. Business Online published an article documenting Tatarstan’s new position 
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as a provider of education and training for future leaders and volunteers in mega-events.86 
The volunteers present at second annual FISU Leaders Academy 2018 would receive 
education on how to coordinate and direct volunteers and how to work for and with 
international sports organizations. Special emphasis was placed on the future Winter 
Universiade in Krasnoyarsk in 2019 and the WorldSkills 2019 event in Tatarstan during 
the event for training their volunteers. The leader of FISU, Oleg Metytsin, stated: “the 
organizational committee for the Krasnoyarsk Universiade is using this forum as an 
opportunity to receive additional experience, studying the groundwork of representing 
other countries.”87 In the article, the view that Tatarstan has managed to accrue expertise 
in organizing mega-events is documented positively. 
The WorldSkills competition is the next mega-event to take place in Kazan. It is a 
competition dedicated to allowing students in high school and college to show their 
vocational skills. It occurs every two years and Kazan successfully won the ability to host 
in 2019. As for the future after the FIFA World Cup, WorldSkills served as one answer 
to alleviating the absence of any major events after 2018. An article published by Business 
Online interviews the President of WorldSkills, Simon Bartley, along with a few experts 
in tourism and mega-events.88 They all take a positive stance towards hosting the 
WorldSkills event. Bartley underscores to major points: the price of hosting and the 
competitive attendance with the World Cup. “It is cheaper than the 2018 World Cup,” he 
states. Bartley adds that, as for attendance, “this time we are talking about 250 thousand 
people.”89 This is compared with the 254 thousand visitors in Kazan during their time 
hosting the World Cup.  
In comparison with the World Cup, the President of Tour Operators of the Tatarstani 
Republic, Ramil Muftakhov noted that “this year, tourists at the 2018 World Cup were 
attracted to some specific events. If we talk about the additional attraction of guests, then 
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the only thing that will give impetus is the weekly holding of any kind of events.”90 Thus, 
the alternative to holding only large mega-events is presented. Muftakov continues, “In 
this past few years, there has been a clear trend: people do not come to Kazan only for 
some event here. They come for musicals, art festivals, food festivals – all of this attracts 
people.”91 In this view, Kazan can attract more tourists by holding smaller events on a 
more frequent basis. 
The other two interviewees commented on the ability for Kazan to attract still more 
tourists through this event. Vitaly Kolgin believes that the WorldSkills event will be 
comparable to Universiade 2013: “of course, the economic effect will be for hotels, 
restaurant owners, and the service sector – they all will receive a big, new flow of people, 
who will spend money.” 92 The view here is comparable to Universiade but focuses on 
the traditional economic benefits of hosting mega-events. The amount of reconstruction 
to be done is a lot less, even the idea of building a new hotel for WorldSkills was 
rejected.93  
The Olympics remained an important aspect of the future of Kazan and hosting mega-
events. Business Online published three articles about the Olympics, the first was with a 
journalist Nick Butler who stated that “[…] in the near future, clearly not. Nobody would 
vote for Kazan now…the anticipated host of the 2032 Olympics is determined in 2025. 
This is very soon, and at this time a lot can change.”94 Butler continued on the current 
political situation between Russia and the West: “the problem is not with your city, or 
republic, the problem is with your country. Nobody wants to give out the Olympics to 
Russia and its current government.”95 This relates to the doping scandal (2015) levied at 
the Russian government that also led to their temporary suspension of membership in the 
Olympics. 
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The infrastructure necessary to host the Olympics is also a concern but judging by the 
history of Tatarstan’s association with the federal government, it holds potential for 
further investment in large projects. Butler stated: “a multitude of stadiums remained after 
Universiade, but a few of them would need reconstructing, they do not fit the technical 
requirements of the International Olympic Committee.”96 He continued, “as a whole, the 
city has infrastructure on the European level, but the Olympics, nevertheless, demand 
serious preparation and investment.”97 While this is a negative when looking at Kazan in 
its current form, the Tatarstani government remains one of the only NCGs that can handle 
the demands of the Olympics while achieving consensus and a result that is without major 
budgetary pitfalls and corruption scandals. If Tatarstan's government proposed the 2032 
Summer Olympics to the Russian government, they would present one of the best options 
in Russia.  
On July 16th, the day after the World Cup ended in Russia, two articles released from 
Business Online covered the future of mega-events in Kazan and the obstacles moving 
forward. In the immediate future, Kazan has created partnerships with the Red Bull Air 
Race, World Skills 2019, and the one part of the World Swimming Championships in 
2022. However, the events hardly compete with the World Cup’s significance as a global 
sports event.  
The only major sports event left to hold is the Olympics, but the article noted three big 
obstacles: 1) the Russian Doping Scandal 2) External Competition and Internal 
Competition 3) Indecision about development around event tourism.98 The Russian 
doping (2015) scandal made international sports organizations more hesitant to give 
Russia another large sporting event. The issue with competition from outsiders is 
recognized as multifaceted with places like India’s capital, New Delhi, vying to hold the 
2032 Summer Olympics. More importantly, Saint Petersburg, Moscow, and Sochi appear 
to be other contenders for the 2032 Olympics. Lastly, Vladimir Leonov said that there is 
another aspect to consider: “should Kazan continue developing the sports avenue in 
mega-tourism? Or leave this strategy behind? Maybe, there is a point to move into 
                                                          
96 Ibid. 
97 Business Online. (2018, July 11). Zhurnalist Nik Batler: «U Kazani net shansov na Olimpiadu». Retrieved 
from Business Online: https://www.business-gazeta.ru/article/388324 
98 Abdullin, J., Shamilov, A., Zainullin, D., & Zimagulov, V. (2018, July 16). Kruche uzhe ne budet: chemu 
nas nauchil CHM-2018? Retrieved from Business Online: https://www.business-gazeta.ru/article/388780 
51 
 
something else, after all, will there be anything else cooler than the World Cup?”99 In 
addition, the Minister of Sports for Tatarstan, Vladimir Leonov, confirmed that the 
Olympics in 2032 would be a possibility for Kazan. Leonov noted, regarding the future 
of Kazan, that “the World Cup is over, but life will continue. We asked this question 
earlier, is there life after Universiade, remember?100 The conversation continues into the 
same obstacles for the future of holding the Olympics: the doping scandal in 2015 and 
the internal competition. In the immediate future, Leonov noted, “of course, we would 
like a big project. We are resting a little and rethinking all of this.”101 The end of the 
article quotes the President of the Olympic Committee of Russia, “in the capital of 
Tatarstan there is a well-developed sports infrastructure. Kazan unites Asia and Europe 
and is a special cosmopolitan center.”102  The strategy remains in the eyes of Tatarstani 
and Russian officials but faces numerous obstacles for hosting an event larger than 
Universiade or the World Cup. 
The competitive identity strategy has led to strategy for cultivating Kazan’s long-term 
image through both hosting smaller, more frequent events and preparation for the 
Summer Olympics. Both are pursued by the Tatarstani government, but perhaps the most 
challenging aspect for the republic is the current position of the Russian government. The 
position of the Russian government with increasingly poor relations with the West and 
the doping scandal placed Kazan’s brand as sports capital under increased jeopardy.  
4.3 The Annexation of Crimea – February 26th to March 26th, 2014.  
The Tatarstani government communicated with the Crimean Tatars before and after 
Russia annexed Crimea. Tatarstan served a specific purpose in the process as Tatars share 
historical relations with the Crimean Tatar ethnic group: Islamic, Turkic language family, 
and a cultural connection with Turkic groups across Eurasia. The Tatarstani government 
served as a solution to a problem in Russian foreign policy. Specifically, the Crimean 
Tatars desired to boycott the referendum and wanted to remain unified with Ukraine. 
Tatarstan possessed a way to mediate the situation. 
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The beginning of the analysis is on February 26th, 2014. Business Online published an 
article surrounding recent protests in Crimea against Euromaidan.103 During this protest, 
encompassed of anti-Maidan supporters and Pro-Russian supporters, two-thousand 
Crimean Tatars arrived in support of the Ukrainian solidarity and Euromaidan. The article 
interviews multiple experts in Russia on the topic. Most of which consider that Crimean 
should still be Russian, Crimean Tatars will be served better as a Russian region, and 
finally, that the Crimean Tatars are divided between the prospects of a united Ukraine, 
separating from Ukraine, and separating and joining Russia.104 
Perhaps the problems that led to Tatarstan’s involvement were shown immediately on 
February 26th. Igor Miroshnichenko, a member of the Political Council of the All-
Ukrainian Association, said that “the Crimean Tatars are absolutely united in their wish 
to live in an independent, united Ukraine.”105 On the contrary, the General Director of 
Folk Arts and Crafts for the Republic of Tatarstan and a Crimean Tatar, Nuri Mustafayev, 
argued that “Russia should do everything possible to return Crimea to the bosom of our 
government.”106 He continues: “if Crimea separates from Ukraine, on the other hand, we 
will make the question of moving people softer.”107 Mustafayev’s response suggests his 
misalignment with Crimean Tatars on the issues relating to historical movements of 
people, specifically, the Crimean Tatar history during the Soviet Union. The Crimean 
Tatar’s history shrouded the visits from Tatarstani officials in a negative light. Lastly, 
Aleksandr Khramchikhin, a Director of the Institute for Political and War Analysis in 
Moscow stated that “‘[the idea that the] Crimean Tatars are for [remaining part of 
Ukraine]’ is simply illegitimate. The Majilis, which has long ago stopped representing all 
of the interests of Crimean Tatars, is saying ‘[that they are] for [remaining part of 
Ukraine].’”108 As the situation in Crimea worsened in the eyes of Russian media, the issue 
of dissent among the Crimean Tatars became increasingly important and soon led to the 
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involvement of the Tatarstani government in the negotiation and mediation process 
occurring in Kazan.  
The next few days the Tatarstani government became more involved in the events in 
Crimea. As Kommersant noted on February 27th, “radicals on the side of the Crimean 
Tatars pushed away those who supported the division of Ukraine.”109 The end of the 
article highlighted the Tatarstani parliament's statement: “Rustan Minnikhanov urged 
Crimean Tatars to make peace in agreement with the Russian population of Crimea.”110 
In another set of interviews on the 28th, Crimea, Rafael Khakimov, a Deputy of the 
Tatarstani Parliament, commented negatively about interference in sovereign affairs of 
Ukraine. He stated that “Russia should not think about the division of Ukraine.” Similarly, 
the former president of Tatarstan and Deputy of the Tatarstani Parliament, Shaimiev, 
stated that “it is necessary to defend the interests of a large number of Russians,” but then 
he continues saying that “it is their domestic conflict. This is a sovereign government.”111  
On February 28th, the Tatarstani parliament decided to send a delegation to mediate the 
conflict in Crimea. However, many onlookers assessed the issue of Tatarstan’s 
involvement differently. Sergei Sergeev, a political scientist at the Kazan National 
Research Technological University, said that “though the Crimean Tatars are not close, 
they are the relatives to Tatars. And Tatarstan wants to show itself in the international 
arena. It is not quite understood if it was done by their own initiative or by the initiative 
of the federal center.”112 The representative of the Tatar Societal Center, Galishan 
Nuriahmet, stated that “[this decision was taken] only under the pressure of Moscow,” he 
continues, “in this way, the federal authorities are trying to ‘divide and conquer’ the 
Crimean and Volga Tatars.”113 Lastly, Business Online published an opinion piece that 
promoted the sovereignty of Ukraine as the best way to allow for the autonomy of Crimea: 
“Crimean Tatars are fighting for their national interests in the current case speaking as 
defenders of the Ukrainian government’s integrity. The whole problem with this is the 
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growth of the xenophobic mood in the Russian Federation, and pseudo-patriotic rhetoric 
in circles close to power [which] obviously pushes Crimean Tatars away from Russia.”114 
Moreover, the Zulftanovich noted that Moscow is aware of the Volga and Crimean Tatar 
ties through the World Tatar Congress, but “without concrete proposals about the 
regulation of problems the effectiveness of the visits will be weak.”115 Tatarstan enters 
the meetings with little productive measures to suggest and comes from a government 
that has limited their sovereignty in the past. While the Tatarstani government became an 
important part of the interaction with Crimea diplomatically, it developed a few 
discussion points that lie deep within Tatarstan’s association with foreign governments 
and the federal center.  
4.3.1 Russian & Tatarstani Stance: Selling Tatarstan 
The first of multiple visits from political and cultural leaders from Tatarstan began in late 
February. After the Tatar delegation returned, the representatives held a press conference 
where Business Online posted the individual comments of the Government Council of the 
Republic of Tatarstan on March 2nd.116  According to the interviewees, the main mission 
of their visit was to talk with local leaders and gain first-hand knowledge about the 
situation unfolding in Crimea. The representatives spent time with members of the 
Crimean parliament and with various societal groups in Crimea. The association with the 
Crimean Tatars was positive according to the interviewees who claimed that the Crimean 
Tatars are prepared to work with the Russian government. Most importantly, the 
representatives learned that people, especially, the Crimean Tatars dealt with many 
problems since the fall of the Soviet Union.117  
The Tatarstani delegation mentioned positive developments in their association with the 
Crimean Tatars. The representative from the World Tatar Congress, Rinat Zakirov, said 
that “by the request of the head of the Majilis, we attended their talks with Russian 
senators. It was confirmed, that the Crimean Tatars are ready to cooperate with Russia.”118 
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Later in the article, it was confirmed that the Majilis and World Congress of Tatars 
(headquartered in Kazan) expanded their current relations through signing a cooperation 
agreement. The Majilis also asked for financial support from Tatarstan, which the topic 
was discussed casually. Next, Razil Valeev noted that Crimean Tatars would like more 
“mutual relations and contacts with Tatarstan.”119  In addition, the results were that 
Crimean Tatars wanted more educational relations and for peace to be established in 
Crimea. Another representative answered: “Crimean Tatars were strongly for Maidan. 
But after communication with our representatives, I think, a change happened in the 
feelings of Chubarov [the leader of the Majilis] and his supporters. They will work with 
us.”120 As the conversation shows, the projected stance of Tatarstani officials strongly 
aligns with the Russian central government’s position. Indeed, the officials are interested 
in their siding with the pro-Russian members of the Crimean government.  
On March 5th, President Minnikhanov arrived in Crimea with another group of 
representatives from Tatarstan. He would meet with various representatives from the 
Crimean Tatar community, as well as officials in the Crimean government. Minnikhanov 
would start contributing to the discourse in trying to create more connections, and 
furthermore, attempting to remove the tension of Crimean Tatar – Russian relations. The 
history of the Crimean Tatars has left many of the leaders interested in returning to Russia. 
Minnikhanov noted that “they experienced a very big tragedy […] We cannot be 
indifferent to their fate. I will meet with their representatives and mediate. If it is within 
my power, then we want to strengthen our contacts.”121 A Crimean Tatar and 
Businessmen, Damir Galiullin, interviewed in this article stated, “the Tatarstani 
delegation came with that goal to persuade Crimean Tatars to agree to the places [a set 
number of government seats in the Crimean government] which they offered them in 
exchange for their silence. Crimean Tatars did not agree with this, and they are against it. 
How the event will develop further, I do not know, but I think Russia will take Crimea.”122 
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Minnikhanov shows sympathy towards the Crimean Tatars history; however, remains 
aligned with the Russian stance of joining them to the pro-Russia groups in Crimea. 
On March 6th, the Supreme Council of Crimea notified the Russia government that it 
wished to have a referendum which allowed Crimea to become a subject of the Russian 
Federation. A representative of Crimea stated that Minnikhanov showed “broad 
diplomatic abilities […]. I am convinced that Crimean Tatars will use their historical 
chance for the regeneration of their rights in the constitution of Crimea as a subject of the 
Russian Federation and receive worthy financing of all programs for returning of the 
deported to normal living conditions.”123 During a meeting on the same day, Minnikhanov 
stated, “it is necessary, of course, to understand the Majilis, before giving an evaluation 
about why they are not pro-Russia. We can understand that these people went through 
such a tough journey: 45 percent of the population was killed during deportations. Even 
though [the deaths] are connected to the Soviet Union, Russia is the successive ruler.”124 
Minnikhanov continued: “it is not necessary to blame them [Crimean Tatars] for this […] 
in this we are to blame […] because we did not work with them earlier […] I mean this 
is not my power […] this is our federal government.”125 Dealing with the issue of the 
Crimean Tatars brings into the discussion the issue of history, and how it is represented 
in the current era: Tatarstan’s relationship with the central government. Moreover, 
Minnikhanov shows the limitations of federal authorities through questions why the 
Russian central government avoided external involvement with Crimean Tatars in the 
past, or at least, delegated the responsibility to Tatarstan. In this way, Minnikhanov shows 
his dismay with the paradiplomacy in Russia: the necessity of complete alignment with 
the Russian government disallows ties between other groups to form. In other words, 
greater decentralization may have allowed this situation to be handled differently.  
Whether the Russian federal government believed Tatarstan could resolve the conflict in 
Crimea remains unknown. The Russian government embraced the image of Tatarstan as 
a peacemaker and positive representation of center-periphery relations. However, the 
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theme of positivity is translated from Tatarstan’s hosting of mega-events to their 
mediation of the situation in Crimea. Tatarstan offered largely irrelevant solutions to 
Crimean Tatar concerns. Though Tatarstan acted again in coordination with the Russian 
federal government, the indication that Tatarstan wanted increased capacity was alluded 
to by Minnikhanov. Thus, the utilization of Tatarstan as a resource in international affairs 
requires concessions on the federal government’s part.  
4.3.2 The Crimean Tatar Response 
The initial Crimean Tatar position on Russian and Tatarstani involvement in Crimea was 
negative. Moreover, the position of Crimean Tatars, which remained unchanged before 
and after the Tatarstani mediation. The leaders of the Crimean Tatar community spoke 
outwardly that they wished to remain part of Ukraine and rejected the legitimacy of the 
referendum. For example, the historical leaders Mustafa Cemilev, and the leader of the 
Majilis, another word for council, at the time, Refat Chubarov, met with officials but 
questioned the timing of the delegation’s arrival during such a chaotic period. On March 
4th, Kommersant interviewed Refat Chubarov, the representative of the Majilis in 
Crimea.126 To the question, “are other governments giving out support to you? Recently 
the Turkish Ministry of International Affairs noted their readiness to help Crimea, the 
authorities in Tatarstan also expressed their position [to help];”127 Chubarov answered, 
“the authorities in Tatarstan represent one subject of the Russian Federation and cannot 
embody any difference from the Russian government.” 128 Furthermore, Chubarov stated, 
“we met with representatives of Tatarstan, societal representatives, writers, but during 
this, we told them, that development of our cultural and scientific connections is better to 
discuss in a more favorable situation.”129 
The confusion about the arrival of Tatarstani officials, and further, the impressions left 
on the leaders of the Crimean Tatar community were expressed on March 7th as well. 
Maxim Shevchenko, a popular journalist and television host, expressed the reservations 
the Crimean Tatars had about their association with Tatarstan: “I called the Simferopol 
from Moscow, and talked with guys from the Majilis and other activists. They met with 
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Minnikhanov with great respect, noting, that they were thankful for his efforts…but a 
question hung over their heads, why no officials from the presidential administration or 
soldiers came to them.”130 On March 7th, Business Online conducted an interview with 
Chubarov about the visit from Tatarstani officials: “the Tatarstani delegation signed an 
immediate agreement with the appointed government of Crimea. We were not previously 
familiar with the text and the terms of the agreement. We are still not acquainted with 
them today […]. I don’t want to say that our Tatar guests offered us nothing specific – 
that’s not true. But, some members of the Majilis expressed bewilderment that the big, 
peaceful arrival of Tatarstan is corresponded with the arrival of the Russian army.”131 
Another meeting occurred between Shaimiev and the former leader of the Majilis, 
Mustafa Cemilev on March 12th. Initially the meeting was supposed to occur between 
them in Tatarstan, however, the meeting was moved to Moscow, where Cemilev only 
agreed to meet with Putin after meeting with Shaimiev.132 The main idea expressed here 
summed up the discourse from the Crimean Tatars and impacted the conversations 
thereafter.  
As seen through both the Russian and Tatarstani stance and the Crimean Tatar stance, the 
Tatarstani government possessed importance to the mediation from a cultural perspective. 
However, Tatarstan’s lack of prior relations with Crimean Tatars hindered any real 
diplomacy. Thus, Tatarstan’s arrival appeared largely symbolic even to the Crimean 
Tatars. In addition, Tatarstan’s image as one of the most influential NCGs in Russia and 
as a multinational, multifaith region triggered multiple discussions about the nature of 
Russian federalism. 
4.3.3 Tatarstan’s Competitive Identity & Crimean Autonomy  
The Annexation of Crimea led to the discourse around the meaning of Tatarstan’s 
relations with the federal government. One comparison, which is made twice by 
commentators in Business Online, was with Leopold the Cat, i.e. Tatarstan plays the role 
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of Leopold the Cat, a cartoon character from television that aired in Russia and the USSR 
who is responsible for keeping two mice under control. An additional connection is made 
to the history of the Kazan cat which is commemorated in a statue in central Kazan today. 
The Kazan cats were used by Catherine the Great to take care of the mice problem within 
Saint Petersburg. The association with Leopold the Cat and the Kazan cats is that 
Tatarstan serves as a tool for the central government to solve certain issues, while 
simultaneously being unable to act outside of Moscow’s will: “the official structure of 
Tatarstan is completely regulated on the federal level, the Russian-Tatars cannot act 
independently from the Russian regime.”133 Thus, the question of Tatarstan’s autonomy 
in foreign relations is noted negatively.  
The question of language, education, and NCG autonomy came to the forefront as 
Crimean Tatars and other interviewees criticized the system of relations in Tatarstan with 
the federal government. Rafael Khakimov noted, “[Crimean Tatars] have their arguments 
[for not joining the Russian Federation] …if Crimea joins Russia, they will have 
broadened powers, but Tatars in Russia…are not allowed [to adopt] the Latin alphabet. 
And, the name ‘president’ in Tatarstan and other regions is forbidden...”134 Consequently, 
the Tatarstani officials are limited in their efforts due to their government’s association 
with the center.  
The weaknesses of Tatarstan’s relations with the federal center were linked to the powers 
accessible to the unimportance of autonomy in the Russian Federation. In an interview 
with Business Online, Viktor Minin, a political analyst, and the Head of State Affairs in 
the Republic of Crimea stated that “[Tatarstan] converted its nationalism in 1991 into 
autonomy which Crimea dreamed about. They converted [their nationalism] into the 
maximum economic and financial independence. But now it has all ended. The whole 
world is falling apart, and the Tatars are falling apart with it. Tatarstan also does not know 
what more to do, after sovereignty, the Millennium Kazan, and the 2013 Universiade.” 
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135 Thus, the negative view is taken that Tatarstan’s autonomy to conduct paradiplomacy 
has hit a limit. 
After Crimea voted to join the Russian Federation in the March 16th referendum, the 
questions about Tatarstan continued: “Crimea noted the wish to receive broad autonomy. 
On this concern, does this not raise conflicts with other subjects of the Russian Federation, 
with Tatarstan, for example, which in recent years successively entered a single 
economic, political, and legal jurisdiction?”136 The response focused on the fact that 
Crimea voted to join Russia as a federal subject and that the Russian Federation can create 
special agreements with federal subjects about the division of powers: “such an 
agreement, for example, we have had with the Republic of Tatarstan since 2007.”137 
Similarly, the agreement signed between Tatarstan and the Russian Federation was cited 
on the February 26th as a potential way for Crimea to receive autonomy. As Kommersant 
stated, “such agreements between regions and the center were abolished, and the legality 
of all of them without exclusion…were carried into an agreement with the Constitution 
of the Russian Federation and federal laws.”138 Thus, the unique position of Tatarstan as 
an NCG holding a power-sharing agreement became a question option for Crimea upon 
entry in the Russian Federation. Since Tatarstan possessed the agreement then, it appeared 
possible to Crimea. However, the ability to put another one in place seemed unlikely as 
the federal government sought to harmonize Tatarstan’s policies with the Russian 
Federation’s. 
The final narrative raised because of Tatarstan’s involvement was the improvement of 
federalism in Russia and more opportunities for Tatarstani power in foreign relations. In 
an opinion piece published in Rimzil Valeev, a journalist and member of multiple Tatar 
cultural organizations, said: “Tatars are acting in Crimea like a real historical force.”139 
Valeev claimed, “Crimean Tatars are representatives of an indigenous group having such 
a status in international law. They need European guarantees of the rights of 
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people…these guarantees are now needed for all Russians and for Kazan Tatars 
firstly.”140 As Prime Minister Medvedev visited on March 24th, Business Online published 
an article: “VIP-visit to Kazan: randomness or consistent pattern?”141 The political 
scientist Vladimir Belyaev stated, “ I consider that the role of Tatarstan can grow because 
it is necessary to proceed to federalism, to which we have pushed Crimea.”142 The 
involvement of Tatarstan has led to a multifaceted discourse evolving from their 
involvement: Tatar strength which has now spread to Crimea in the form of ethnic, 
cultural connections, and the history of Volga Tatar autonomy that Crimea also sought to 
receive. 
The utilization of cultural resources was a final aspect that began to be implemented 
towards the end of the analysis. The criticism of the cultural connection was highlighted: 
Crimean Tatars and Volga Tatars are separated in language and were divided on the 
decision to annex Crimea. Regarding the language separation, Chubarov stated, “Tatar 
and Crimean Tatar languages have a big separation from each other compared to Russian 
and Ukrainian. It is easier for us to understand Azerbaijanis, Gagauz, and Turks.”143 The 
first steps were to create a Crimean Tatar language channel; however, the initial view by 
some is that both Tatar and Russian already would occupy enough space for Crimean 
Tatars to receive news.144 Tatarstan planned to engage Crimea through tourism and the 
expansion of children’s summer camps in the region.145  
The involvement of Tatarstani paradiplomacy in the annexation of Crimea brought 
multiple things into focus. First, the limitations of Tatarstan as an international actor, in 
this case, became clear. The cultural connection used through the arrival of President 
Minnikhanov, a Tatarstani delegation, and cultural leaders was met with immediate 
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skepticism from the Crimean Tatars leaders. The conversations had no tangible result, as 
one Crimean Tatar noted: “[Tatarstani officials] came with empty hands and nothing but 
promises…”146 The reasoning for their involvement: whether it occurred under their own 
volition or under the command of the Russian federal government remained unknown. It 
appeared that analysts were split on the subject. However, with the decline in Tatarstan’s 
autonomy, the initial response from many was skeptical that Tatarstan sought 
involvement without first checking if their goals aligned with the federal government’s 
objectives in the region. On a larger scale, the Tatarstan’s paradiplomacy brought out 
many critical discussions about the role of Russian federalism and the necessity to give 
more autonomy to the regions. Even though the results of Tatarstan’s involvement were 
weak, and seemingly, symbolic, the fact that they were involved at all displays the 
powerful significance of paradiplomacy in Russia and the underlying tensions in Russian 
federalism. 
4.4 SU-24 Incident – November 25th to December 25th, 2015  
Towards the end of 2015, relations between Russia and Turkey entered a critical juncture. 
Turkey shot down a Sukhoi 24 Russian military jet on the Turkish – Syrian border on 
November 24th, killing the pilot (TASS, 2015) The incident occurred surrounding the 
Syrian civil war where Turkey and Russia supported opposite sides. The downing of the 
military jet affected relations between Turkey and Russian regions as well. Tatarstan, 
Chechnya, Bashkortostan, Tyva, and others held cultural, economic, and educational 
contacts with Turkey. Tatarstan, specifically, held all three and received around 25 
percent of foreign investment from Turkey during the period of the SU-24 incident.147 
Because of the fallout in relations, Kommersant and Business Online covered varying 
aspects of the conflict and marked the different narratives arising about Tatarstan and its 
place in the Russian Federation and in international relations.  
The difference between the Annexation of Crimea and the SU-24 incident is noticeable 
as President Minnikhanov did not comment on the incident until December 21st, nearly a 
month after the Russian plane was shot down. The major themes surrounding Tatarstan 
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in the event were the geopolitical nature for Russia, economic relations, and cultural 
relations.  
The first op-ed posted by Business Online focused mainly on the threat of a third world 
war.148 The incident gives rise to a greater game taking place within the region: battle 
between Islam and Christianity, and the East and West, division of countries on the 
Atlantic, within Europe, relatives of China, and the heirs of Genghis Khan. The author 
emphasizes that dialogue should occur between the Erdogan and Putin. While none of the 
Turkic language and cultural groups is mentioned, the larger battle being discussed has 
implications for many ethnic groups within Russia. Similarly, on November 25th, 
Kommersant released an article titled: “What Russia and Turkey mean to each other.”149 
The article expresses relations in purely economic terms: Russian – Turkish trade 
amounted to 31.1 billion dollars.150 Most notably, the issue is focused without 
acknowledging the substantial cultural presence Turkey has on Russia and vice versa. 
The Muslim and Turkic linguistic cultural presence in Russia is not mentioned.  
4.4.1 A Threat to Competitive Identity: Economic Relations 
From the four events discussed, the issue SU-24 incident represents the one where 
Tatarstan showed the most resistance to the foreign policy of Moscow. Perhaps the 
clearest aspect of this was the reticence of President Minnikhanov, who waited nearly a 
month until speaking on the issue. On December 21st, Minnikhanov stated regarding the 
Russian sanctions on Turkey: “This is a difficult, painful situation, and it is very painful 
for Tatarstan.” He repeats the statements from a recent address from Putin, “Turkey is a 
friend for Russia. And for Tatars they are brothers, we are in one language group, one 
religious sect. Of course, as the president said, for us, their support is very serious because 
we have large Turkish projects. They believe in our president. They believe in our 
republic. 1.5 billion dollars of investment, modern factories, where 95-98 percent of 
employees are Tatarstani or Russian citizens, and these enterprises are residents of the 
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Russian Federation.”151 This statement differs starkly from the one delivered at the start 
of the incident by President Putin that the shot down flight was a “stab in the back” on 
the part of Turkey (TASS, 2015). The policy changes from the Russian central 
government which agreed with Tatarstan’s competitive identity to attract investment and 
conduct mega-events. The change on the part of Russia towards sanctioning Turkey led 
to a disagreement in policy. 
Throughout the first week, after the incident occurred (November 24th – December 1st), 
the focus remained solely on economic relations. This is related to Russia’s threats of 
economic sanctions towards Turkey. The first of a special report from Business Online 
that covered the conflict between Turkey and Russia questioned the ending of twenty 
years of growing economic relations between Tatarstan and Turkey because of one 
incident.152 This was the beginning of a larger narrative from Business Online, which 
framed the economic sanctions and the negativity surrounding the sudden feud as 
threatening to Tatarstan’s economic ties. The article described the ways Tatarstan benefits 
from Turkish investment through building factories and creating jobs in the region. The 
article noted that “already many years Mintimer Shaimiev, and after him, Rustam 
Minnikhanov placed a bet on the development of Turkish – Tatarstani economic relations, 
taking care of Turkish investors, putting emphasis on ethnic and religious affinities.”153 
Secondly, the 250 thousand residents of Tatarstan visit Turkey annually for vacation.154 
The article noted that “Tatarstan has limited opportunities to somehow influence 
decisions taken on geopolitical questions in Moscow.”155 
On November 28th, Business Online interviewed a group of business people and political, 
of which three representatives were from Tatarstan’s government. They reflected a 
mutually shared opinion: the sanctions will hit Tatarstan especially hard, the conflict 
should be shortened and contained, and with a softer tone that the press and central 
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government is overreacting.156 The representative of the Chamber of Commerce and 
Industry of the Republic of Tatarstan, Shamil Ageev, stated: “I think very many want this 
conflict to go far [into the future]. And, we do not want it to go on. In any case, it needs 
to stop on time. And, now, hysteria is spreading in the press. This atmosphere of excessive 
patriotism. Everywhere mistakes are happening, but it is forbidden to turn little mistakes 
into big ones.”157 Business leaders expressed similar concerns and hope that Tatarstan 
could serve as a mediator, “Tatarstan has always been positioned as a mediator between 
Turkey and Russia, therefore all of this will directly affect Tatarstan.”158 The centrality 
of Tatarstan in the debate takes a role that is primarily economic. But the level of 
paradiplomacy that occurred between Tatarstan and Turkey prior to the incident provided 
entrenched relations that were difficult to end.  
Rafael Khakimov, the Vice President of the Academy of Sciences for the Republic of 
Tatarstan, discussed the Republic’s role in Turkish – Russian relations and the general 
role of Tatarstan in international affairs, “For Tatarstan, Turkey is a serious partner… in 
what sense should we tear apart our relations? In no sense.”159 Thus, the most important 
aspect for Tatarstan is to maintain the quality of life of the population. “For Tatarstan, it 
is more important not to allow economic stagnation which threatens all Russians.” 160 
Tatarstan, in this case, serves as a mediator between Russian and Turkey, but also between 
aggressive and non-aggressive members of Russia’s foreign policy establishment. 
Khakimov ends his article, “Tatarstan always could find common ground in the most 
difficult political situations. It’s possible to say that our entire republic is diplomatic by 
nature…saving positive relations with Turkey, we can remain a convenient platform on 
which to conduct negotiations...”161 Even without direct involvement in the conflict, the 
promotion of trade with Turkey in Tatarstan demonstrates an alternative path to policies 
of the central government’s policy.  
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On December 1st, another article was released by Business Online profiling economic 
sanctions announced on the prior day by Dmitri Medvedev and discussed the economic 
damage done to Tatarstan because of the sanctions.162 The main problems relate to the 
cancellation of flight routes to Turkey and the inability for tour operators to send tourists 
there, which could lead to the loss of a thousand jobs.163 On December 11th, Business 
Online interviewed an Azerbaijani businessman that does business between Turkey and 
Russia and is centered in Tatarstan, answers similarly to the past interviewees: “it is 
important not to allow this conflict to go too deep, it will not be worse for Turkey but for 
us.”164 In searching for a mediator to the conflict, he suggested looking to Nazarbayev: 
“his influence is great in both territories, there is nobody better than him to make peace 
between Putin and Erdogan.”165 Thus, his statement mimics the others but looks away 
from Tatarstan as a potential mediator. 
On December 16th, a little over three weeks after the initial incident, the sanctions were 
confirmed. Kommersant published an article looking deeper into their effects and how 
they avoided the fears of investment projects abruptly ending and a large-scale 
curtailment of economic relations between Tatarstan and Turkey.166 The article brings 
attention to the fact that “the limitation concerns only new contracts [that is those 
concluded until December 10th remain legal], and in the future, it will be possible for 
exclusions for workers of Turkish companies already in the Russian market having 
business in Russia.”167 The article continues quoting a central government official, “we 
do not plan to сut off our own hands and feet – the sanctions firstly are oriented to do 
minimal harm to the Russian economy.”168 Tatarstan is mentioned once as the 
construction of a new factory was under question because of pending sanctions.169 
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The opposition within the media frame shows the position Tatarstan has cultivated as an 
economic partner to Turkey. One of the most important aspects of competitive identity is 
the attraction of foreign investment. In the world limited investors, and especially through 
the downtown of Russian relations with the West, Tatarstani officials and Business Online 
highlight that the loss of investment is more of a loss for Russia than for Turkey. The 
placement of Tatarstan’s competitive identity, specifically, their ability to attract foreign 
investment leads them to maintain their stance.  
4.4.2 Ending Cultural Events & Link to Larger Regional Struggle 
The cultural relations between Tatarstan and Turkey were increasingly covered as 
Kommersant and Business Online analyzed the incident, and the subsequent Russian 
response. As noted, the central government pursued economic sanctions first. However, 
the potential for a decline in cultural and educational relations became known as the 
Russian Minister of Culture, Vladimir Medinsky, sent a memo to all Russian republics 
demanding the termination of their membership in Turksoy. The UNESCO supported 
international organization, TurkSOY, is a Turkic language and cultural organization 
dedicated to enhancing bonds between groups across Eurasia. Tatarstan is a member of 
this group. In 2014, TurkSOY selected Kazan as the capital of the Turkic world, and 
Tatarstan intended to host the Turkvision singing contest in 2015.170  
Business Online examined the demand for Tatarstan to leave TurkSOY. Interviewees 
claimed that that the termination of contact between the cultural organization had nothing 
to do with the SU-24 incident. Moreover, Razil Valeev, a representative from the 
Committee for Education, Culture, Science and National Questions in Tatarstan, said that 
“to end relations is easy, but nevertheless, it is necessary to look into the future. It is 
necessary to find common ground. Turkic people – they are our kindred nations.”171 
Rimzil Valeev, a public figure, believing that the central government was taking 
advantage of the situation to weaken Turkic groups in Russia stated, “this will mean that 
Russia does not respect Turkic peoples and is striving in any situation to infringe upon 
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their cultural interests.”172 Thus, the reaction to sever the ties of Turkic linguistic and 
cultural groups documents the insecurity within Russia. The severing of ties outside of 
just economic connections shifted to educational exchanges. However, comments from 
Tatarstani officials surrounding this issue were not included in the publication. 
Kommersant only noted that the regions could have a stronger reaction to the decline in 
relations.173 Tatarstan remained within TurkSOY following the memo while others like 
Bashkortostan left. (Kommersant, 2015). 
The view from Tatarstan reflects a commitment to the competitive identity they pursued 
with mega-events and the stability gained with Moscow after recentralization. Tatarstan 
engaged in a mix of economic and cultural paradiplomacy. With their refusal to leave 
TurkSOY, it showed the limitations with which the central government can control 
Tatarstan’s foreign relations. If the central government restricts Tatarstan’s role in 
TurkSOY and with hosting mega-events, it blocks the investment in Tatarstan as a place 
that hosts mega-events. Secondly, the ability for Tatarstan to attract the involvement of 
outside actors like Turkey allows Russia an option for potential diplomatic gains.  
 As time passed after the incident, Business Online sent correspondents to Istanbul to 
provide analysis of the situation for Tatars and Russians in Turkey. The tone was positive 
as it noted the politeness of the people, the friendly interaction between Turkic language 
groups, and the quality location of the Tatarstani consulate. The correspondent noted that 
the location of the Tatarstani consulate is in “Asiatic part of Istanbul, which looks very 
European – new apartment buildings, a modern medical university, business centers, 
greenery, armed police are not necessary for such state.”174 The correspondent 
interviewed a citizen who apologized: “please forgive us for the plane. Friends should not 
act that way.”175 The correspondent discussed the Tatarstani consulate in his first article: 
that the Tatarstani officials are discussing the situation with Turkish firms and waiting for 
                                                          
172 Ibid. 
173 Nigmatullin, A., Samigullina, E., & Sharafiev, I. (2015, November 30). Razryv s TYURKSOY: 
Vladimir Medinskiy trebuyet ot Tatarstana otrech'sya ot tyurkskogo mira. Retrieved from Business Online: 
https://www.business-gazeta.ru/article/146579 
174 Magizov, M. (2015, December 5). «Izvinite, pozhaluysta, nas za etot samolet»: kak Stambul vstrechayet 
rossiyan. Retrieved from Business Online: https://www.business-gazeta.ru/article/147151 
175 Ibid. 
69 
 
the situation to be defined further.176 The climate described in the article showed the calm 
in Turkey and emphasized the relationship Tatarstan’s diplomatic mission has in Turkey.  
In the second article, the ease of going to the Tatarstani consulate is noted in comparison 
to Russia’s.177 The article is still focusing on the positive aspects: Turkic people 
specifically Tatars and Bashkirs, congregate, comfortably in Istanbul.178 Perhaps, the only 
hostile aspect of the trip is the response from a vendor, who stated: “Turkey is a strong 
country. We are children of the Ottoman Empire, we are afraid of nothing.”179 The quote 
is used in the article partially to show that the economic sanctions and an embargo on 
Turkish goods, apparently, have not spread fear among citizens. An important aspect 
highlighted by Simon Anholt regarding the appearance of competitive identity:  
Another issue with cultural relations was raised by a Tatarstani resident during an 
interview with Vladimir Putin on December 17th and covered multiple times in 
Kommersant in the period to the end of the analysis.180 A student from Tatarstan asked 
questions regarding the targeting of people of Turkish descent in Russian universities, 
close economic connections between Turkey and regions like Tatarstan, and the 
persecution of businessmen in Moscow that has displeased Tatarstan, and led to private 
business being pushed out of Moscow.181 “In some schools, the director is demanding the 
data of certain students concerning their parents which might be Turks – what is this for? 
This is horrible. It was necessary to give a tough response that this must not happen. Why 
was this not done?”182 An excerpt of Putin’s response, perhaps defined the future of the 
situation regarding Tatarstan: “I agree with you that it would be necessary to say that 
relations with the Turkish people is one thing and the Turkish government is another […] 
concerning relations with Tatarstan, of course, they were not created in a year. It is 
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necessary to understand, that the mentality of the people is very similar, the connections 
are very close […]it would be a drastic step to shut down those projects, which have gone 
on for years and decades. For a very long time, gradually, at least since the mid-90s, we 
built these relations step by step. Yes, we are not developing relations with the Turkish 
government, but that doesn’t mean that it is necessary to destroy all projects. But, I am 
afraid that the situation is developing poorly, and it is necessary to prepare for the 
worst.”183 The importance of Tatarstani – Turkish relations is highlighted. Most notably, 
Putin connected the economic and cultural relations as a precursor for the involvement 
between the two groups.  
In another article, it was mentioned that the question regarding close relations between 
Turkey and Tatarstan was accompanied by a question about the continued existence of a 
Tatarstani president. In response, President Putin answered, “Chechyna said: no, in our 
country there must be one president […] we relate to the choice of Tatarstan with respect. 
Because of this, you can decide for yourselves then, alright?"184 In response to this, 
Kommersant published an article a week later, “Two-story Federalism.”185 The article 
takes a negative view towards the increased preferential treatment towards certain 
regional leaders and their ability to sway the policy in their direction: “representatives of 
the first group argue with the center and feel that they are the sovereigns of their territory 
[…] like in a real federation. The second class does not possess special rights […].”186 
The article refers to Tatarstan in its ability to keep the title of president and to openly 
criticize the ending of relations with Turkey. To this degree, the conclusion is that 
Tatarstan, among a few others, have cultivated relations with the center based on personal 
capacities rather than simply utilizing the tools of Russian federalism. 
The final article during the analysis mentioned Tatarstan within a wider geopolitical 
context – one that involves many of Russia’s own citizens.187 In this context, Tatarstan is 
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mentioned as a republic unprepared and unwilling to face enemies most Russians see as 
threatening. As the article points out, 15 million Muslims live in Russia, and they will not 
all react the same to attacking a primarily Muslim county.188 As it relates to Tatarstan, the 
republic cultivated close ties with the region that cannot simply be broken in one day. The 
article stated that “at a minimum, four regions with Turkic roots – Tatarstan, 
Bashkortostan, Tyva, and Yakutia – all stood on the verge of separatism 20 years ago. If 
the conflict will deepen, old melodies can again become popular – and create dissonance 
within the war march, which enthralled us in this past year.”189 Though small, the 
civilizational divide is used as a source of fear and concern to the Russian ethnic majority.  
With the conclusion of the SU-24 event, the nature of their relations in paradiplomacy 
was parallel in harmony prior to the event began. Tatarstani policies were not in 
disagreement with any stipulations of Russian foreign policy, but after the SU-24 
incident, the instability highlighted a disagreement in where the direction of Turkish – 
Tatarstani, Turkish – Russian relations should go into the future. In the end, the Russian 
central government implemented sanctions that would have the least effect on the Russian 
economy. Tatarstani connections and investment project from Turkey are highlighted as 
vital to their economy, and this led to significant framing in Business Online being a bad 
decision. The disagreement on policy put Tatarstan in a position of parallel disharmony. 
But, as reflected on throughout the analysis, Tatarstan has remained in the realm of joint 
action with the Russian central government. 
4.5 Comparison: Three Trends 
The analysis of Tatarstani paradiplomacy shows three different patterns. The use of 
culture as a resource is the first. The second is as a government tool. Lastly, 
paradiplomacy is used as a promoter and protector of material interests. In nearly all 
cases, both the Tatarstani and Russian government benefit from the interaction. Perhaps, 
the only example of Russian policy being limited is displayed in the final case where the 
legacy of Tatarstani economic and cultural relations with Turkey forced a reassessment 
of Russia’s economic and humanitarian sanctions. 
                                                          
188 Ibid. 
189 Sukhov, I. (2015, December 25). Ravneniye so mnogimi neizvestnymi. Retrieved from Kommersant: 
https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/2884735 
72 
 
4.5.1 Culture as Resource  
Throughout the analysis on mega-events, Tatarstan is considered to possess a cultural 
advantage in how they manage their republic. As a result, the close bonds lead officials 
to manage events better and achieve a larger consensus among the population. From a 
Russian government perspective, the consensus and better management make the republic 
a better place to invest federal money, even if the image of a social consensus from the 
Tatar nation is contrived.  
The various cultural differences apparent in Tatarstan provide strength in a few aspects. 
As for mega-events, it allows Tatarstan and the Russian government to market the region 
as a multinational, multifaith paradise. During the analysis, Tatar culture is described only 
briefly in the introduction to the region. This includes during the opening event of 
Universiade where certain elements of Tatar culture were presented. In the initial 
description of Kazan, the city is described as a place that is open to all religions and 
possesses a large part of the population that is ethnically Tatar. Thus, the use of Tatar 
culture serves as an introduction to the city and the region.  
Tatar cultural events were conducted during both mega-events. Sabantuy and the Koresh 
World Championships serve to separate Tatarstan through displaying cultural events 
native to the region. This presented an option when note hosting mega-events to attract 
tourists to the region along with other small global mega-events. Despite the cultural 
uniqueness, the audience remains small for such events. 
Both the Russian and Tatarstani governments utilized the role of Tatar culture as a 
member of the Turkic linguistic and cultural group. The role plays a positive and negative 
role. It both extends and simultaneously restricts Russian foreign policy. For example, 
Tatarstan served as a mediator and to show the multinational nature of Russia, but this 
multinational character is what limited Russian from easily sanctioning Russia after the 
SU-24 incident.   
4.5.2 Government Tool – Tatarstan and Russia 
During both the annexation of Crimea and SU-24 Incident, the analysis revealed that both 
the Russian federal government and Tatarstan itself utilize the position of the republic as 
an alternative diplomatic voice. Though the Tatarstani diplomatic mission in Crimea 
corresponded to the Russian one, the representation of Tatarstan in the media is as a 
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sympathetic ally to the Crimean Tatars. This allows the Russian government to pursue a 
role of strength while acknowledging points of criticism from the Crimean Tatars: the 
deportations conducted under Stalin. 
The ability for Tatarstan to host global mega-events came with significant dependence on 
the central government to substantiate their strategy. The goal of making Kazan a global 
city which will host the Olympics required complete compliance with the interests of the 
central government. The issue with finding usage for the sports facilities, finding a way 
to increase federal investment, and the absence of strong Tatar cultural narratives shows 
the necessity for compliance during global mega-events. The conversion of this 
compliance into discourse was shown in the continued presence of the question: Is there 
life after Universiade? Is there life after the World Cup? The narrative reflects the fear of 
declining investment of the government and the image of Kazan which remains 
questionable as Russia’s sports capital. 
As for compliance during the annexation of Crimea and the SU-24 Incident, the 
involvement of Tatarstan in Crimea came without negative discourse regarding Russia’s 
involvement. However, the discourse does connect Tatarstan's involvement to their power 
as a republic, which gives a benefit to their paradiplomacy and extending their image as 
a powerful NCG in Russia. The silence of Minnikhanov and the discussion in Tatarstan 
urging a diplomatic solution never distinctly parted with Russia’s foreign policy but was 
interpreted as a stand against the central government within the media. Thus, compliance 
is necessary, but hesitation often serves as enough of a means to show that disagreement 
exists between Tatarstan and the federal government. 
4.5.3 Promotion and Protection of Material Interests 
Almost immediately after the downing of the SU-24 military jet, discourse revolved 
around the termination of economic relations and what the economic relations with 
Turkey meant to Russia. With broad paradiplomatic relations in Tatarstan, the region 
highlighted the immediate damage that Russian sanctions would do to citizens living in 
Tatarstan. The damage was reflected in Business Online’s articles with special reports 
covering numerous ways the conflict would affect Tatarstan.  
Tatarstani paradiplomacy protects and promotes material interests largely through 
playing on the aspects of competitive identity gained through Tatarstan’s harmonizing 
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relations the Russian central government. The procured investment for mega-events made 
the removal of cultural events for TurkSOY to be held in Tatarstan unrealistic as it would 
lead to the development and promotion of Kazan. Since the central government has 
promoted this aspect of Tatarstani paradiplomacy, it would be undoing the results of 
mega-events conducted in the past.  
Secondly, governments utilizing a competitive identity seek to attract foreign investors. 
This happened without evident Russian disagreement prior to the SU-24 incident. The 
immediate termination of relations with Turkey and various investment projects put 
Tatarstan in a position where they had obvious concerns about Russian policy. As a result, 
the reticence of President Minnikhanov triggered the disagreement of numerous members 
of the government in Business Online showed that the material interests in Tatarstan were 
too strong to ignore.   
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5. Conclusion 
Tatarstani paradiplomacy played a role in some of the most critical episodes of 
international relations in Russia in the twenty-first century thus far. In looking at the 
discussions displayed in Business Online and Kommersant, Tatarstani paradiplomacy 
converged and diverged with Russia’s foreign policy stances. Secondly, the discussions 
taking place in the national and regional media highlight the ability for Tatarstan to 
engage in paradiplomacy. In the context of decreasing sovereignty from regional actors, 
Tatarstan can serve as an exemplar to engage external actors in a way that the central 
government will accept.  
Both media outlets displayed divergent narratives about Tatarstani paradiplomacy. For 
example, Kommersant revealed somewhat negative views towards Tatarstan’s 
involvement in paradiplomacy. During global mega-events, and Tatarstan’s association 
with the Turkic world, the focus remained on Tatarstan’s role as an outlier among NCGs 
in Russia, and that this existence, had a positive and negative side. Business Online 
discussed Tatarstan through a more positive lens. The media outlet offered critical views 
of the central government during the annexation of Crimea and the SU-24 incident, which 
emphasized the role of Tatarstan as largely positive in both instances. With mega-events, 
the events and regional government were focused on in a positive manner. However, 
between the Universiade and FIFA World Cup, greater emphasis and skepticism was 
placed on Tatarstan’s future in large sporting mega-events and the absence of Tatar 
culture within them. The biggest separation between the two media sources is the amount 
of coverage spent on the issues discussed within the analysis. Kommersant published little 
on the FIFA World Cup specifically in Kazan.  
Though Tatarstan paradiplomacy displays some divergence or lies within the parallel 
disharmony model. It is important to note that compliance is compulsory in the case of 
mega-events. And, secondly, that the divergence in the Tatarstani stance after the SU-24 
incident reflected a rare disagreement between Tatarstan and Russia. The disagreement 
is shown in the competitive identity of Tatarstan and the branding efforts evident in the 
media analysis. For example, the goal to attract investment and be open to outsiders would 
not align with the region’s image if Tatarstan sided with the actions of the Russian 
government to sanction Turkey and end ongoing investment projects within the Republic. 
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In addition, the goal of long-term financial stability in Tatarstan and the substantial 
investment from the center makes Russia obliged to cultivate the strategy pursued by 
Tatarstan. In this way, Tatarstan’s branding efforts became a liability to Russia’s foreign 
policy interests. In the end, the Russian central government must consider the effects of 
its foreign policy on NCGs. 
The role of Tatarstan has continued largely because of the republics willingness to comply 
and meet criteria for federal investment. Regarding global mega-events, the region acts 
as an event manager, with Kazan pursuing the brand of sports capital and third capital of 
Russia. Throughout the analysis, the idea of Kazan as sports and third capital of Russia 
was both accepted and denied. To outsiders, seeing Kazan for the first time, this audience 
accepted the image presented to them. However, Kommersant and Business Online note 
internal skeptics to the idea of Kazan’s preeminent status as sports and third capital of 
Russia.190191In particular, the Universiade and FIFA World Cup did not provide enough 
acknowledgement to consider Kazan as the sports or third capital of Russia. Thus, 
Tatarstan needs more acknowledgement from the Russian central government of Kazan’s 
preeminence in both areas through symbolic measures or substantiation. Most 
importantly, more substantiation is needed through federal investment. As the Summer 
Olympics is the only major event left, and the most notable for creating long-lasting 
brands for cities, Tatarstan hits numerous roadblocks in its path to creating a lasting sports 
image. The status of Russia in the world and Tatarstan’s position within Russia document 
the difficulties of NCGs to successfully compete in the global arena. For this reason, the 
ability for Tatarstan to conduct sporting mega-events and even other mega-events is in 
jeopardy due to the competitive identity inside and outside of Russia. 
During the annexation of Crimea, the Tatarstani government was promoted as a 
successful Russian republic and close relative to the Crimean Tatars. However, the 
Crimean Tatars roundly rejected the image of Tatarstan as providing an alternative to the 
Russian government’s stance. As a result, this joint coordination with the Russian federal 
government failed. 
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In the case of the SU-24 Incident, Tatarstani officials discussed the economic and cultural 
strain caused by the feud between Russia and Turkey in 2015. The narratives surrounding 
the event highlighted the cultural events Tatarstan takes part in with Turkey and the 
economic relations of Tatarstan as vital to the competitive identity of the region. As a 
result, the Russian government never responded to Tatarstan’s refusal to leave TurkSOY 
and their hesitance to end economic relations with Turkey. This showed one aspect of 
strength that Tatarstan shows in response to the central government’s desire to limit 
paradiplomacy. 
Tatarstan remains an important actor within Russia and serves as a crucial case for 
paradiplomacy in states outside of entrenched democracies and federations. In addition, 
the use of competitive identity to highlight the ways Tatarstan seeks to fulfill a type of 
paradiplomacy in harmony with the central government while also pursuing closer ties 
abroad is one that can be applied to other crucial cases in the future.  
In the future, a comparative analysis of Tatarstan and other NCGs in Russia could reveal 
more about how competitive identity, branding, and paradiplomacy come together to 
allow for the persistence of paradiplomacy in a recentralized state. This research has 
shown that paradiplomacy holds vital importance in NCGs that do not lie within the 
traditional cases of paradiplomacy. Moreover, the thesis highlights that recentralizing 
states cannot immediately eliminate NCGs’ desire to communicate with foreign entities 
and that they, in certain cases, stand to benefit from paradiplomacy. Lastly, it is important 
to understand the effects of such outliers like Tatarstan as a means for regions to extract 
wealth from central governments and cultivate a global image. Such cases drastically 
expand the opportunity to examine NCGs outside of entrenched federal democracies. 
While limited to a critical juncture, the Tatarstani case shows the impact of paradiplomacy 
on domestic politics and international affairs.   
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